Photo: This is a modern geopolitical image of China’s strategic posture in the Western Pacific, combining naval power, regional geography, military modernization, surveillance technology, and the Taiwan question.

Key Takeaways

• The Chinese strategic culture is primarily shaped by historical memory, particularly the Century of Humiliation and the lessons drawn from internal weakness and foreign domination.

• National unification, mainly regarding Taiwan, is still the fundamental objective of the Chinese foreign policy.

• China’s grand strategy combines the economic and military expansion and regional influence-building under a framework described as active defense.

• Confucian hierarchy, Eastern strategic thought, Maoist legacy, and pragmatic adaptation to Western systems all influence modern Chinese strategic behavior.

• Beijing seeks not just to rise within the international system, but to restore what it perceives as its historically rightful central position.

PART II. Strategic Doctrine & Contemporary Behavior

The defensive orientation of the country is reflected even in Beijing’s approach to its nuclear weapons (China’s Strategic Defense in the New Era). These are not expected to be used by China for a first strike against the enemy, in contrast to the established nuclear doctrines of the U.S. and the former USSR, and now Russia, which envisaged a first strike. Instead, they are reserved solely for retaliation (a second nuclear strike) (Twomey 2006).

The tension with Taiwan in 1955 led to the development, for the first time, of a nuclear arsenal. The Soviet Union supported this effort, both due to ideological affinity (Twomey 2006). However, the alignment between the two communist regimes did not last, resulting in the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear advisors. This event directly delayed the development of the Chinese nuclear program, with the first nuclear test taking place only in 1964 (Twomey 2006). The build-up of a numerically strong nuclear arsenal was further delayed due to the consequences of the Cultural Revolution, reaching only into the mid-1980s (Twomey 2006).

To this day, China possesses a relatively small nuclear arsenal, always in comparison with those of the U.S. and Russia, while its efforts are focused on modernization rather than expansion. Furthermore, Chinese nuclear strategy, also influenced by Confucianism, rejects the concept of a first nuclear strike, restricting the use of nuclear weapons exclusively to retaliation, as already noted above (Twomey 2006).

At the conventional level, the country’s leadership seeks the development of the armed forces’ capabilities, since their strengthening constitutes the second main pillar of China’s revival, alongside economic growth, ensuring the “Never Again” of the Century of Humiliation (Allison 2018). The foreign powers that defeated China were militarily powerful, especially in terms of their navies. For this reason, Beijing places emphasis on the sea, as it does not wish under any circumstances to repeat the historical mistake of turning its back on the oceans, a decision made in the 15th century under the Ming dynasty, which withdrew the country from maritime affairs (Papasotiriou 2013).

Naturally, the transformation of China from a traditionally land power into a maritime one, correcting the Ming mistake. requires time. Yet the Chinese, due to their culture, can demonstrate particular strategic patience, as we will see further below.

We must also note an important parameter of Chinese strategic culture concerning wartime human losses. Chinese society is tolerant of such losses, in contrast to the West and especially the U.S., so long as Chinese troops fight for the greatness of China (Allison 2018).

Nevertheless, it is clear that the Chinese are not always in a defensive posture, even though their strategic culture is defensive. This paradox is summarized in their expressed strategic doctrine of active defense (China’s Strategic Defense in the New Era): defense at the strategic level, but offense at the operational and tactical levels (Defense Intelligence Agency: China Military Power). Both in times of peace and in times of war, their grand strategy is realist (realpolitik) and therefore flexible (Allison 2018). They faithfully follow Sun Tzu’s advice to be as flexible as water (Koliopoulos 2008).

Indeed, on several occasions during the 20th century they chose to attack first, confirming another significant element of Eastern strategic thought: surprise. Examples include the Korean War in 1950 against the U.S., the 1962 attack on India, the 1969 clashes with the USSR, and the 1979 attack on Vietnam. Surprise attack is a Chinese choice, especially when the country is under pressure, showing indifference even to the size of the opponent (Allison 2018), while applying the doctrine of active defense (Ashraf 2017).

The emphasis that the Chinese place on surprise, deception, and intelligence naturally derives from the tradition of Eastern strategic thought. To show the importance of the above in a single phrase: surprise is considered the key to victory, and deception the key to surprise (Koliopoulos 2008).

It would be a mistake to assume that modern Chinese strategic culture is shaped solely by historical memory. It is a fact that the Chinese armed forces (PLA) systematically study the country’s ancient strategic culture, while not overlooking the fact that it has its limitations in the modern strategic environment (Chiselli 2018). Realistically, and in order to bridge this gap, the PLA does not hesitate to study above all the doctrines of other armed forces as well as their technological achievements, so as to draw conclusions about their methods of operation (Chiselli 2018).

Chinese traditional culture rests upon doctrines and beliefs that continue to permeate its principles to this day. The most important of these is undoubtedly Confucianism, as already noted. Confucianism is not a religion but rather an ethical philosophy, and it served as the country’s ideology during the imperial period (Papassotiriou 2013). According to this doctrine, hierarchy is of crucial importance, as it determines both order and harmony. The Chinese desire that the order governing their social culture be extended to the level of international relations. In other words, they do not seek expansion through conquest, and for this reason military involvement is considered the last resort. A characteristic feature of Chinese culture is that it does not seek to export itself or to impose itself forcibly on other peoples (Twomey 2006).

Furthermore, Confucianism is based on the idea of moral order. In practice, this means that rulers must first and foremost be educated and must govern morally (Papassotiriou 2013). Political hierarchy is identical to social hierarchy and must be harmonious and balanced (Jacques 2012). The model of government and society is based on the family. Within the framework of the Confucian family, the duty of the descendants is to respect the authority of the father, who in turn must protect and care for the members of his family (Jacques 2012). In the Chinese reality, the state is the father, whom the children (the citizens) owe respect and obedience, while the exchange is protection and prosperity. Therefore, the state is a necessary good, as it is the source of order, morality, and meaning (Jacques 2012). Finally, it should be noted that ancestors are of paramount importance within the framework of Confucianism, as they are considered to be permanently present (Jacques 2012).

Confucianism is only one branch of traditional culture. The other branch is Taoism, which is contemporary with Confucianism. It is more introspective and mystical, as it seeks spiritual liberation (Braudel 2007). Buddhism has had a comparatively smaller influence on traditional Chinese culture than Confucianism and Taoism.

The second main pillar of Chinese culture, as we have already noted, is communism. The People’s Republic of China, at its founding in 1949, was supported on three pillars, all under the leadership of Mao Zedong (Papasotiriou 2013). The first concerns the CCP, the second the state, and the third the People’s Liberation Army (Papasotiriou 2013). The gradual emancipation of the CCP from the USSR was completed in 1956 with Nikita Khrushchev’s condemnation of Joseph Stalin (Papasotiriou 2013). Yet Soviet self-criticism affected the CCP and Mao personally, who invited Chinese intellectuals to speak freely about the regime (Papasotiriou 2013).

This move marked the beginning of a process that led to the exile of 700,000 educated Chinese to prisons and labor camps across the country (Papasotiriou 2013). At the same time, the CCP elite distanced itself from the USSR and proclaimed the Great Leap Forward, that is, the radical modernization of the Chinese economy (Papasotiriou 2013). The mobilization of peasants led to a reduction in production, with the result of a sharp increase in deaths from malnutrition and a contraction of the country’s GDP (Papasotiriou 2013).

The solutions proposed by Chen Yun were highly pragmatic and were eventually accepted by Mao (Papasotiriou 2013). The new Chinese economic policy emphasized development through the use of specialized personnel and the provision of material incentives, measures that diverged considerably from what could be called “communist” (Papasotiriou 2013). With this policy, the Chinese economy managed to re-enter a growth trajectory.

Since then, pragmatism has characterized the CCP, whose leader later launched the last domestic political campaign: the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), which, by the Party’s own admission, inflicted the heaviest losses on the people, the Party, and the state since its founding (Papasotiriou 2013).

The country entered the modern era under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, who undertook the task of rapprochement with the West abroad and disengagement from Mao’s Cultural Revolution at home (Papasotiriou 2013). Ultimately, the internal reforms provoked, in 1989, widespread reactions, mainly by students, which led to the events of Tiananmen Square, with losses estimated at 3,000 (Papasotiriou 2013). Despite the internal unrest, the growth of the Chinese economy was impressive, and it continued with undiminished intensity during the first decades of the 21st century, making the country the second-largest economy in the world. In 1997, the handover of Hong Kong by the British authorities to China constituted a milestone, as it satisfied Chinese demands for Western reparations for the damages suffered by the country during the Century of Humiliation (Papasotiriou 2013).

Concluding the reference to China’s political ideology, it should be noted that the CCP is pragmatic, as it has abandoned communist ideology (Feldman 2015). For example, individualism, a hallmark of Western civilization but not of Sinic civilization, has been in full development in recent years, because it is promoted by the Party and its policies that encourage entrepreneurship and consumerism (Feldman 2015). Moreover, the Chinese elites themselves do not appear to be particularly ideologically driven.

Chinese culture displays significant differences compared to its Western counterpart. To understand this difference, we should note that until the late 18th century, that is, relatively recently, China had no conception of diplomatic relations, as it had no established ties with other states: it neither maintained embassies abroad nor permitted foreign embassies on its soil. In fact, it did not even have a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is indicative that as late as 1792–1794, Britain unsuccessfully attempted to integrate the country into the European international society of sovereign states as an equal member (Papasotiriou 2013).

The above may appear unusual for Western political thought and culture, but one must not forget that in the Chinese worldview the emperor was the sole ruler on earth, since he was the “Son of Heaven” (Allison 2018). Confucius’s saying that since there are not two suns in the sky, there cannot be two emperors on earth, is indicative (Allison 2018).

Samuel Huntington, in his work The Clash of Civilizations, classifies China under the Confucian civilization, recognizing the significant influence Confucianism has exerted on Chinese culture. In contrast to Western civilization, which primarily promotes individualism, freedom, free markets, democracy, and individual rights, concepts that the Chinese regard with suspicion, as they do anything foreign to them, Chinese culture prioritizes the supremacy of the state over society, and the supremacy of society over the individual (Allison 2018).

Another difference between the two civilizations is found in their perception of time, which is of exceptional importance as it clearly illustrates Beijing’s strategic patience, something that must always be considered (Allison 2018). More specifically, the Chinese, owing to their millennia-long historical trajectory, think in terms of centuries and even millennia, giving priority to securing long-term benefits. The West, by contrast, expects more immediate returns (Allison 2018).

Regarding human rights, Beijing does not reject the fact that they have universal application; however, it incorporates into them “Asian values” in order to justify the different practices of the Chinese authorities, namely, the emphasis on hierarchy and the paternalistic role of the state (Feldman 2015). It would not be an exaggeration to note that China is primarily a civilization which only recently became a nation-state (in the 19th century), and only after being forced to do so by the great powers of the time (Jacques 2012).

We have seen how historical memory significantly influences Chinese culture at the strategic level. But the memories of the Century of Humiliation are not the only ones. For the greater part of its history, China stood at the center of the international system (Twomey 2006). The country’s leading position was so self-evident that it was considered “natural,” both by Chinese society and by the peoples bordering China.

Hierarchy is also of exceptional importance for the Chinese, who perceive their country as superior to all others within the Asian state system (Twomey 2006). It is a fact that Chinese culture and civilization influenced neighboring states such as Taiwan (which Beijing considers Chinese territory), Korea, Japan, and Vietnam (Feldman 2015), while today its radiance is widely diffused even in the West.

For Chinese culture, the country is the center of the world. Indeed, in the Chinese language, the word used for China (Zhongguo) means “Middle Kingdom.” “Middle” here does not refer geographically to a country situated between others, but to one located between Heaven and Earth. This is indicative of the Chinese worldview.

For the Chinese, the rise and dominance of the West is merely a temporary phenomenon, which the current CCP leadership has promised the people will come to an end (Allison 2018). The reader thus understands that in reality, Chinese leadership does not merely aspire to rise to the top of the international system, but to return the country to the position it occupied for centuries and to which it rightfully belongs. Modern China demands respect and recognition from the other powers (Allison 2018).

Conclusion

It is a fact that Chinese culture constitutes a component of Beijing’s soft power, which strengthens the country’s international presence as its economy continues to grow (Nye 2011). Beyond culture, other key components of soft power are political values and foreign policies (Nye 2011), which, however, Beijing does not particularly emphasize on a global scale.

The Chinese may be the only nation in the world so intensely bound to its history. Always faithful to the perception of the superiority of their culture and civilization, they ultimately came into contact with the other great powers — and were defeated by them. This was the infamous Century of Humiliation, the era during which the pendulum of power shifted toward the West.

Yet, imbued with the teachings of Confucianism and Taoism, and carried forward by the triumph of Maoism, the Chinese returned to the forefront of world affairs, developing a peculiar form of nationalism (Braudel 2007). For the West and for the United States they are usurpers of hegemony; for themselves, they are restorers to the rightful position to which they belong. They ardently desire respect and recognition from all.

China’s strategic culture does not explain every political decision made by the country’s leadership, but it undoubtedly constitutes a valuable tool for understanding the international system as it is shaped today by Beijing’s rapid rise. As Napoleon remarked: the dragon appears to have awakened…

Bibliography

Katsoulas, Spyros. 2017. The Concept of Strategic Culture. Athens: Stratigikon.

Koliopoulos, Konstantinos. 2008. Strategic Thought from Antiquity to the Present. Athens: Poiotita.

Papassotiriou, Charalambos. 2013. China: From the Heavenly Empire to the Emerging Superpower of the 21st Century. Athens: Poiotita.

Paschalidis, Grigoris. 1999. Introduction to the Concept of Culture, in Introduction to Greek Culture, Vol. A. Patras: Hellenic Open University Press.

Allison, Graham. 2018. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? New York: First Mariner Books.

Ashraf, Junaid. 2017. “String of Pearls and China’s Emerging Strategic Culture.” Strategic Studies 37.

Braudel, Fernand. 2007. Grammatica of Civilizations. Athens: MIET.

Defense Intelligence Agency. 2019. China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win. Washington: DIA Military Power Publications.

Feldman, Noah. 2015. Cool War: The Future of Global Competition. New York: Random House, an imprint of Penguin Random House LLC.

Ghiselli, Andrea. 2018. “Revising China’s Strategic Culture: Contemporary Cherry-Picking of Ancient Strategic Thought.” Cambridge University Press.

Gray, Colin S. 1981. National Style in Strategy: The American Example. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Haglund, David G. 2014. “What Can Strategic Culture Contribute to Our Understanding of Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific Region?” Contemporary Security Policy 35.

Huntington, Samuel. 2017. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Athens: Patakis.

Jacques, Martin. 2012. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. New York: Penguin Books.

Nye, Joseph S. 2011. The Future of Power. New York: PublicAffairs.

Snyder, Jack L. 1977. The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operation. RAND Corporation.

The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 2019. China’s National Defense in the New Era. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

Twomey, Christopher P. 2006. Chinese Strategic Cultures: Survey and Critique. SAIC.

Sun Tzu. 2008. The Art of War. Athens: Oxy.

Ying, Fan. 2000. “A Classification of Chinese Culture.” Cross Cultural Management: An International Journal 7(2).

Power shapes space through architecture.

Introduction

If art gives form to political imagination, architecture is perhaps its most visible expression. Buildings serve practical needs, but they also organize space, shape memory, and teach people how to experience power. A palace, a parliament, a temple, a triumphal arch, a monument, a skyscraper, a train station, an airport, or a government square speaks before anyone says a word. Our buildings and our cities are statements telling people where authority lives, how it wants to appear, what kind of emotions it wants to produce, and what kind of story a society wants to talk about itself.

Architecture is power made visible. From the beginning of organized political life, rulers understood that power needed physical form. Laws could command obedience, armies could enforce order, and wealth could sustain authority, but buildings gave power permanence. They made it appear stable, sacred, and almost natural. A ruler may die, a dynasty may collapse, a regime may change, but the structure often remains. This is why architecture has always been one of the favorite languages of power: it survives longer than speeches, and it speaks loudly even when nobody is speaking.

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Photo: UN Security Council Chamber /Public Domain

The United Nations Security Council is not weak because it lacks authority. It is vulnerable because its authority increasingly rests on a political structure that no longer reflects the world it is expected to govern. Eight decades after 1945, the Council still carries the legal weight of the postwar order, but it operates in a world shaped by decolonization, demographic change, regional power shifts, strategic competition, and rising demands for representation. The question is therefore not whether the Council still matters because it clearly does. The deeper question is whether it can remain legitimate without reform.

Executive Summary

The United Nations Security Council (UN/SC) remains today the most authoritative institution in the international system for decisions regarding peace, war, sanctions, peacekeeping mandates, and the legal authorization of collective security action. Its decisions still carry a unique legal weight because the Council is the only UN body empowered to adopt binding measures under the UN Charter, including sanctions and the authorization of force. For that reason, the debate over Security Council reform is not a technical discussion about institutional design, but a strategic debate about the future legitimacy of global security governance.

However, the UN/SC was designed in 1945 to preserve great-power participation inside a collective security framework after the failure of its predecessor, the League of Nations (LoN). This design offered permanent seats and veto power to the United States, the Soviet Union, later represented by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, and China. At the time, this reflected the power distribution that emerged from the World War II. Eight decades later, the UN/SC still carries the authority of the post-1945 order while operating inside a far more complex, multipolar, and regionally fragmented world.

In today’s geopolitical landscape, the distance between legal authority and political legitimacy is widening. Since 1945, the UN itself has expanded from 51 founding members to 193 member states, while decolonization, demographic growth, economic redistribution, and regional power shifts have transformed the global balance of power. That said, Africa has no permanent seat despite representing more than a quarter of UN membership. Additionally, Latin America has no permanent seat while the world’s most populous state, India, and a rising economic and military power, remains outside permanent membership. Other important powers like Japan, Germany and Brazil, also remain excluded from permanent representation. At the same time, the Islamic world and much of the Global South see the UN/SC as structurally distant from their political weight and security concerns.

This resulting not the immediate collapse of the UN/SC but the gradual weakening of its practical relevance. In other words, the Council will continue to exist, meet, vote, mandate peace operations, renew sanctions regimes, and serve as the primary diplomatic theatre for global crises, however, its ability to create binding consensus on the highest-stakes conflicts is becoming increasingly constrained by great-power competition, veto politics, geopolitical fragmentation, and the growing frustration of states excluded from permanent representation.

In this regard, formal reform has become a necessity because the UN/SC’s current structure no longer reflects the political, demographic, and regional realities of the twenty-first century. Simultaneously, a formal reform remains highly unlikely because any amendment to the UN Charter requires adoption by two-thirds of the General Assembly (UN/GA) and ratification by two-thirds of UN members, including all five permanent members of the Security Council (United Nations, 1945). This gives each current permanent member an effective veto over reforms that could undermine its own privilege.

Consequently, we should not expect an immediate institutional reform, but a rather a progressive adaptation to 21st century realities and to the evolving power distribution regionally and globally. These adaptions could eventually prevent the UN, and its most crucial body, the UN/SC, from becoming obsolete.

The main judgment of this report is that the UN/SC faces a high-probability risk of legitimacy erosion and a medium-to-high probability risk of functional bypass over the next decade. The Council is not obsolete, but its unreformed structure is increasingly misaligned with the world it is expected to govern. The challenge for member states is therefore to manage a difficult contradiction: serious reform is essential for long-term legitimacy, while incremental practice-based reform is the most realistic path for near-term risk mitigation.

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Photo: This is a symbolic visual journey through Chinese historical memory, blending old maps, maritime encounters, imperial architecture, calligraphy, and modern China.

Key Takeaways

• The Chinese strategic culture is primarily shaped by historical memory, particularly the Century of Humiliation and the lessons drawn from internal weakness and foreign domination.

• National unification, mainly regarding Taiwan, is still the fundamental objective of the Chinese foreign policy.

• China’s grand strategy combines the economic and military expansion and regional influence-building under a framework described as active defense.

• Confucian hierarchy, Eastern strategic thought, Maoist legacy, and pragmatic adaptation to Western systems all influence modern Chinese strategic behavior.

• Beijing seeks not just to rise within the international system, but to restore what it perceives as its historically rightful central position.

PART I. Historical Memory & Cultural Foundations

Issue Overview: China’s Path from Humiliation to Strategic Revival

When the West thinks of China, it often imagines a rising power in purely economic or military terms. But behind the numbers, ships, and missiles lie something far older. A worldview shaped by thousands of years of history, humiliation, and philosophy. To understand China’s next moves, one must first understand its strategic culture, a lens through which Beijing interprets the world, justifies its actions, and defines its destiny.

Introduction

19th, 20th, and 21st Century: China’s Path from Humiliation to Dominance

It is an indisputable fact that the most significant rivalry of the modern era is between the United States (U.S.) and the People’s Republic of China (China), as they are the two most powerful states of the modern international system. The evolution of this rivalry, hegemonic, as termed in the discipline of International Relations, can affect the entire state system in multiple ways. For this reason, various scholars attempt to analyze the behavior of the U.S. and China to extract, as safely as possible, conclusions regarding the form their rivalry will take in the near future.

Obviously, International Relations theory constitutes the basis of analysis, with multiple levels (system, state, individual), as well as the areas upon which it focuses. The purpose of this paper is to concentrate on the field of Chinese strategic culture, as it constitutes an indicator that can help provide a broader understanding of the country’s strategic behavior and the policy decisions made by its leadership. However, caution is needed: strategic culture[1] is a tool for understanding strategic behavior, but it should always be treated as such. As a concept, it can explain every political decision, since actors inevitably possess culture, but it cannot predict future state behaviors. It constitutes only one parameter of Chinese strategy, essentially offering an interpretation of the causes for specific strategic decisions (foreign policy decisions), by no means the only one, since strategy by nature is a continuously evolving process.

More specifically, the strategic objective of Chinese foreign policy is national unification, that is, today, the annexation of Taiwan into the mainland, so that unity is restored after it was disrupted by the victory of Mao’s communists in 1949 and the flight of the nationalists to the island of Taiwan (Papasotiriou 2013). Its rapid economic development presupposes that trade routes and supply lines remain unaffected by any threat, whether originating from state or non-state actors.

In China’s National Defense in the New Era (2019), the Chinese national strategy is recorded. According to it, Beijing explicitly considers the U.S. solely responsible for the intensification of international strategic competition, since its policies undermine China (China’s Strategic Defense in the New Era). The U.S., as the most powerful actor in the East Asian region, possesses the strongest navy in the world and a network of alliances/agreements with states that are Beijing’s rivals in the area. Consequently, China, which fervently desires its economic development to continue unimpeded, seeks to protect its fragile trade routes and supply lines from the American threat, while at the same time replacing the U.S. as the leader of its region by increasing its influence economically, politically, diplomatically, and militarily.

This will be achieved through economic strengthening, in the framework of which the colossal investment program One Belt One Road has been launched, and through the attainment of naval supremacy with the clear reinforcement of the Chinese armed forces in all sectors (Ashraf 2017). Finally, it seeks the reform of the entire International System of states to its own advantage.

The characteristics of Chinese strategic culture, to which we will refer more extensively later, are the following: traditional culture with centuries of history and principal influences from Confucianism, Taoism, and to a lesser extent Buddhism; Eastern strategic thought as depicted in the work of Sun Tzu; and historical memory, since the Han Chinese are a people profoundly tied to their millennia-long history, the origins of which go back to around 2200 BC (Papasotiriou 2013).

Other characteristics of modern Chinese strategic culture are Maoism as political ideology, as well as Western influences that affect the country’s political elites. Another feature is the partial abandonment of isolationism, as the country increasingly concludes economic agreements with other states, and also the partial abandonment of the doctrine of “peaceful rise,” since it now appears to assert sovereignty dynamically in the South China Sea at the expense of its neighbors and the U.S. (Ashraf 2017).

Therefore, Chinese strategic culture is shaped by geopolitical, historical, economic, and religious factors, offering the framework within which the leadership’s strategic ideas and policies are formulated (Gray 1981).

Evidence & Analysis: Foundations of Modern Chinese Strategic Culture

Chinese Strategic Culture

Modern Chinese strategic culture is distinct and unique, both because of the country’s geography and because of its millennia-long history. It is naturally rooted in modern Chinese culture, which is a mixture of three elements: traditional culture, communist ideology, and Western influence (Fan 2000).

Culture constitutes a constantly evolving entity, dependent on geopolitical and technological changes (Twomey 2006). Traditional Chinese culture possesses a history of thousands of years[2], a language, despite its variations during its evolution, and incorporates different religions, philosophies, and schools of thought such as Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism (Fan 2000), as we will see below.

Similarly, modern Chinese strategic culture, shaped over the centuries, developed because of the shock of defeat in the Opium Wars and the Century of Humiliation. Contributing to this formation was also the definitive collapse of the imperial system in the 20th century, since the Confucian system proved inadequate for the industrial age (Papasotiriou 2013).

For modern Chinese, their history teaches that any internal weakness or division will ultimately be exploited by foreign powers (Twomey 2006). In particular, the most recent Century of Humiliation was the result of internal division, which facilitated the invasion of foreign powers (British, French, Dutch, Germans, Americans, Soviets, and especially Japanese) (Twomey 2006).

Because of their millennia-long history, the Chinese shape their strategy based on principles drawn from historical events (Allison 2018). A characteristic example is the enormous investment program that will help the country project its power on a global scale, shifting the balance of power in Asia through the unification of Eurasia (Twomey 2006).

This specific investment program, announced by current President Xi Jinping during an official visit to Kazakhstan in 2013, is equivalent to 25 Marshall Plans and is called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Ashraf 2017), formerly known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), or, in Greek translation, the “New Silk Road”, showing its connection to the historical Chinese trade routes.

Historical memory is omnipresent in modern China. These extremely traumatic memories of the Century of Humiliation lead the leadership of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) to pursue internal stability imperatively, regardless of cost (for example, with regard to human rights) (Twomey 2006).

The objectives of the Chinese leadership are threefold. First, it seeks the restoration of the country’s grandeur, meaning its return to the dominance it enjoyed before Western intrusion (demand for regional supremacy). Second, it seeks to secure absolute control over the territories of greater China, including Taiwan (demanding from neighboring states that they recognize and respect Chinese superiority). And finally, it desires the revival of its historic sphere of influence, both land and maritime, so that it will be accepted and respected by the other great powers (Allison 2018).

Recovering lost prestige and respect is of paramount importance. As long as the Chinese President promises this, while simultaneously delivering economic growth regardless of environmental cost, the Party retains legitimacy within society (Twomey 2006). Consequently, historical memory contributes to the shaping of Chinese strategic culture in such a way that it relentlessly pursues internal stability and cohesion, meaning it must display no weakness outwardly that could invite foreign powers (as in the events in Hong Kong and the harshness with which demonstrators have been and continue to be treated by the authorities).

Indeed, internal instability combined with exposure to the industrialized West in the first half of the 19th century brought about the end of Chinese dominance. Since then, military confrontations with foreign powers consistently resulted in Chinese defeat, indicatively: in 1839 with the First Opium War; in 1856 with the Second; in 1894 with Japan’s invasion and the conquest of Manchuria; in 1899 with the Boxer Rebellion, against which eight states united and ultimately overthrew the Qing dynasty in 1912; the renewed civil war; and the new Japanese invasion in 1937, which caused the deaths of more than 20 million Chinese (Twomey 2006).

The communist seizure of power in 1949 marked the end of the Century of Humiliation. Precisely these achievements of Mao (leader of the communists) remain to this day the core of the CCP’s legitimacy, as he is credited with saving the country and expelling the foreign powers (Twomey 2006).

Today, Chinese students are taught the feeling of shame associated with the Century of Humiliation and the aforementioned defeats. The lesson drawn from these defeats is simple: Never again, and nothing is ever forgotten (Twomey 2006). Patriotism, a peculiar form of nationalism, is reinforced by the need to avenge the national humiliation suffered by the country. Moreover, it is extremely useful for the CCP, since it derives legitimacy from society, especially at a time when economic growth appears to be slowing (Twomey 2006).

The current CCP leadership seeks the strengthening of the country and the expulsion of the U.S. from its periphery, even as it recognizes that, essentially, it was because of Washington that the much-desired stability and security existed in the region, which allowed for uninterrupted economic prosperity. Geographically, the field of confrontation is located in the South China Sea (Allison 2018).

International relations scholars have long commented on Beijing’s reluctance to replace the U.S. as overseer in areas from which the latter withdraws. This Chinese reluctance may appear surprising, but it is entirely consistent with the country’s strategic culture, which is primarily defensive (Allison 2018).

Of course, this development was influenced by Confucianism as well as the Eastern tradition of strategic thought, summarized masterfully in the work of Sun Tzu, who was himself a follower of Confucianism (Koliopoulos 2008). According to this doctrine, presented in the form of maxims in The Art of War, war is one of the available tools of politics and must be employed rationally (Koliopoulos 2008). Furthermore, offensive operations are considered particularly costly and should therefore be avoided. What is paramount is systematic analysis, knowledge of oneself, of the opponent, and of the battlefield (Koliopoulos 2008).

Supreme success is defined as the enemy’s surrender without battle (Sun Tzu 2008), since for Chinese strategists’ war is primarily psychological and political (Allison 2018). Moreover, the best strategy is to attack the enemy’s strategy itself in order to achieve victory as quickly as possible (Koliopoulos 2008).

Bibliography

Katsoulas, Spyros. 2017. The Concept of Strategic Culture. Athens: Stratigikon.

Koliopoulos, Konstantinos. 2008. Strategic Thought from Antiquity to the Present. Athens: Poiotita.

Papasotiriou, Charalambos. 2013. China: From the Heavenly Empire to the Emerging Superpower of the 21st Century. Athens: Poiotita.

Paschalidis, Grigoris. 1999. Introduction to the Concept of Culture, in Introduction to Greek Culture, Vol. A. Patras: Hellenic Open University Press.

Allison, Graham. 2018. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? New York: First Mariner Books.

Ashraf, Junaid. 2017. “String of Pearls and China’s Emerging Strategic Culture.” Strategic Studies 37.

Braudel, Fernand. 2007. Grammatica of Civilizations. Athens: MIET.

Defense Intelligence Agency. 2019. China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win. Washington: DIA Military Power Publications.

Feldman, Noah. 2015. Cool War: The Future of Global Competition. New York: Random House, an imprint of Penguin Random House LLC.

Ghiselli, Andrea. 2018. “Revising China’s Strategic Culture: Contemporary Cherry-Picking of Ancient Strategic Thought.” Cambridge University Press.

Gray, Colin S. 1981. National Style in Strategy: The American Example. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Haglund, David G. 2014. “What Can Strategic Culture Contribute to Our Understanding of Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific Region?” Contemporary Security Policy 35.

Huntington, Samuel. 2017. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Athens: Patakis.

Jacques, Martin. 2012. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. New York: Penguin Books.

Nye, Joseph S. 2011. The Future of Power. New York: PublicAffairs.

Snyder, Jack L. 1977. The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operation. RAND Corporation.

The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 2019. China’s National Defense in the New Era. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

Twomey, Christopher P. 2006. Chinese Strategic Cultures: Survey and Critique. SAIC.

Sun Tzu. 2008. The Art of War. Athens: Oxy.

Ying, Fan. 2000. “A Classification of Chinese Culture.” Cross Cultural Management: An International Journal 7(2).

[1] Our purpose is to introduce the reader to Chinese strategic culture. For the sake of clarity, since the term itself is not particularly developed in Greece — we will here provide what we consider the most complete definition: strategic culture constitutes a set of beliefs, mentalities, and behavioral patterns of a geographically defined collective entity with a historical experience (Katsoulas 2017). The term was coined in 1977, when Jack Snyder, in a study, attempted to show the different approaches of American and Soviet strategists to limited nuclear war (see Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operation, RAND, 1977). As the reader may understand, this definition is multidimensional, since there is difficulty even in defining the concept of culture itself, as the latter is a linguistic borrowing (see Grigoris Paschalidis, Introduction to the Concept of Culture, in Introduction to Greek Culture, Vol. A, HOU, 1999). The strategic culture of a state depends on its internal structures, socio-economic organization, political regime, geography, and historical memory (Katsoulas 2017). It does not concern only the conduct of war, as it also arises from technological infrastructure and is based on political ideologies, consequently linking it to the geopolitical position of each state (Haglund 2014). These are only some of the factors influencing the decision-making process in the field of international relations. States in the international system are considered fundamentally rational actors, but it is well known that they do not all act in exactly the same way. This very differentiation is what the theory of strategic culture attempts to explain (Katsoulas 2017). Two further observations regarding strategic culture: First, the concept of culture should not be confused with that of education (paideia), as it is broader and indeed encompasses it (Paschalidis 1999). Second, culture is often confused with the concept of civilization, especially in the Greek language, since as noted it is a linguistic borrowing. It is not the purpose here to analyze the etymology of the two terms, but it suffices to mention that they are essentially complementary, as they both describe the same phenomenon: human creation in a specific era (Paschalidis 1999). Culture refers more to intangible achievements, while civilization refers to material ones (Paschalidis 1999). Finally, it is important to highlight the distinction between strategic culture and strategy so as to avoid confusion. Strategy is understood as the alignment of means and ends under the prism of an actual or potential conflict, and it presupposes the existence of at least one opponent (Koliopoulos 2008). In conclusion, the continued study of strategic culture will further contribute to understanding the role of culture in international relations (Chiselli 2018).

[2] Spoken Chinese differs considerably from region to region; however, the same is not true for the written language, since the use of ideograms rather than an alphabet rendered it uniform throughout the entire country (see Ch. Papassotiriou, China: From the Heavenly Empire to the Emerging Superpower of the 21st Century).

Before states act, they imagine who they are.

Introduction

Power is a complicated concept, expressed in different ways depending on the context. We usually discuss about military capabilities, how geography shapes policies, borders, technology and innovations, markets, treaties, and alliances. Power can sometimes be measured, and sometimes it remains more vague, symbolic, and difficult to define. Concepts such as hard power, soft power, and smart power help us describe some of its forms, but they do not exhaust its meaning. Power can also speak through buildings, paintings, novels, films, music, monuments, symbols, uniforms, ceremonies, and myths.

People, individually and collectively, express themselves reflecting the realities of their times. Thus, Art and Power, or perhaps more precisely power and imagination, are deeply connected. Before states act, they imagine what they fear, what they remember, what they have suffered, what they deserve, and what kind of future they believe belongs to them. Art is one of the places where that imagination becomes visible. Do not forget that human beings have always been storytellers. We understand the world through stories, and these stories reflect the ways we perceive the reality around us. In our stories, we preserve our ancestors, our most dramatic and epic moments, our dreams for the future, our arrogance, our fears, our triumphs, and our worst disasters. From those stories, we create art as a way to express who we are, what we believe, and what we remember.

This series will explore how power is depicted through major forms of art: architecture, painting, literature, cinema, music, monuments, and memory. Using examples from different civilizations, eras, and political contexts, Art and Power will look at the ways our stories reflect and influence our geopolitical realities. The goal is not to move away from geopolitics, but to look deeper into the human imagination behind it. Because power is never only what states possess but more importantly, what societies believe about themselves.

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Photo: UN General Assembly Hall / UN Photo

Executive Summary

The international system has entered the face of strategic competition between the great powers which is translated in structural instability. The later is characterized by declining predictability, uneven power and the progressive disbelief in the rule of law. This transformation does not constitute a stable transition toward multipolarity but instead, it reflects a condition of competitive disorder where power politics multiply and at the same time the institutional constraints lose their effect.

Regarding middle and smaller powers, this context generates asymmetric risks. The common characteristic of these aforementioned states is that they lack the capabilities to shape systemic outcomes in accordance with their interests. Consequently, they are vulnerable to shifts in global security , finance, energy, trade and technological governance. Due to their limited power, they seek to anchor their national security and prosperity in international institutions and alliances. However, in the current era of great power competition such mechanisms are not sufficient.

This report evaluates the principal risks facing small and middle powers over the 2026–2035 horizon. It draws on a realist understanding of international politics that emphasizes anarchy, survival, and power asymmetries, while integrating institutional and economic evidence from NATO, the European Union, the United States, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, SIPRI, IISS, RAND, and other authoritative sources. The analytical framework is influenced by Professor Panagiotis Ifestos’ long-standing argument that systemic anarchy never disappeared and that periods of apparent stability merely masked underlying power realities.

The core judgment of this report is that the margin for strategic error for middle and small powers is narrowing. In a system where coercion increasingly replaces persuasion, and where great powers selectively apply rules, states that fail to invest in their strategic capacity, political, military, economic, and cognitive, will experience declining autonomy and heightened exposure to external shocks.

Key findings:

• Coercive diplomacy and grey-zone pressure against middle and small powers is rising.

• The alliances are still necessary but they are becoming increasingly conditional and interest driven.

• International Institution are no longer secure protection.

• Strategic passivity has high long term risks.

The consequences of strategic inaction are real as they include a progressive loss of decision-making freedom, economic vulnerability, and increased susceptibility to security crises triggered by external actors.

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Photo: NATO Military Committee meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Credit DoD photo by Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro / Public Domain

Key Takeaways

• The war in Iran has exposed a serious political split inside the Atlantic alliance regarding the limits of European support for U.S. military action outside NATO’s collective-defense framework, which can potentially damage the alliance itself (NATO 1949).

• Several European nations like France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Poland have each restricted aspects of U.S. military access linked to the conflict. This selective and uneven alliance response has led top U.S. officials to state openly that Washington will rethink its commitment to NATO.

• Recent reporting indicates that U.S. officials have discussed punitive options against allies viewed as uncooperative, including symbolic measures against Spain and a reassessment of U.S. diplomatic support for certain British interests. NATO officials have also clarified that the founding treaty has no mechanism for suspending a member state, which makes some of these options legally difficult but politically significant.

• The most important consequence is political since trust among the allies has weakened, while Washington is more willing to judge allies by their defense spending and their strategic usefulness, access, and political alignment in crisis.

• The U.S. can readjust its commitment to NATO and even create an “alliance of the willing” and the strategic useful to its core interests in a more transactional terms, relying more on flexible coalitions rather than automatic alliance solidarity (NATO 2025).

Introduction

The war against Iran has opened a new and serious fault line in transatlantic relations. The main issue is not whether NATO still exists as the central military alliance in the Euro-Atlantic space but whether Washington and key European capitals still understand alliance solidarity in the same way. Now, the answer appears to be no as NATO is facing its most severe crisis since it was founded in 1949.

Several European governments have made clear that they do not consider NATO membership an automatic obligation to facilitate a U.S.-led war outside the treaty’s collective-defense framework. That distinction is central since NATO was created to defend allied territory against external attack, not to function as a blank check for every military operation launched by one member beyond the North Atlantic area. Article 5 remains tied to collective defense, and Article 6 defines the treaty’s scope (NATO 1949; NATO 2025). Consequently, the Iran war falls outside that default logic. What has changed is that the core European allies are no longer treating this as a technical legal point but instead, they are enforcing it politically and operationally.

That is why the restrictions imposed by those allies matter. More specifically, reports suggest that Spain closed its airspace to U.S. military aircraft involved in attacks on Iran and had already refused the use of jointly operated bases for those operations. Italy denied U.S. aircraft access to Sigonella for Middle East operations without prior authorization. France also maintained restrictions on U.S. military flights and related support tied to the conflict. Germany even though allowed the use of Ramstein Air Base from the U.S. forces; it has repeatedly denied its participation in the war by rejecting calls to send its warships in the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, Poland has rejected the informal U.S. request to send its Patriot air defense system to the Middle East. Polish officials, including the Minister of Defense, stated that the Patriot systems are crucial for protecting polish air space and the Eastern flag of NATO.

Together these decisions alongside the denial of the U.K. to enter the war in Iran indicate that Europe’s strategic priority is different from the American and the assumption that the U.S. forces have automatic access across allied territory in no longer valid. In this strategic environment, NATO is still there but it is becoming a conditional alliance in practice, a very different political climate from the one that defined earlier phases of the transatlantic relationship.

This conditional logic became clearer after many reports suggested that an internal Pentagon email outlined possible measures against NATO allies that Washington believes failed to support U.S. operations in the Iran war. The reported options included measures against Spain and a possible reassessment of U.S. diplomatic support for British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The key point is not that NATO can easily suspend a member state; the treaty does not provide a simple mechanism for that. The real point is political indicating that parts of the U.S. administration are now thinking about alliance discipline in punitive terms. This means that NATO membership may remain formally equal, while U.S. treatment of allies becomes increasingly unequal in practice.

The consequences for U.S.-Europe relations are already visible

To begin with, trust among allies have been damaged because several European states appear to believe that they were expected to absorb the military, political, and economic risks of a U.S.-Israeli war without meaningful prior consultation. That matters because alliances do not function only through treaty text but also through process, especially consultation before escalation. When that process weakens, support becomes conditional. In other words, for the European allies solidarity cannot be demanded especially since Washington took unilateral action without their fully support in a war that many Europeans consider reckless and strategic mistake.

Additionally, the war in Iran has reinforced European concerns about the increasingly transactional character of U.S. leadership. The clearest sign came on March 31, when Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth declined to clearly reaffirm America’s commitment to NATO’s collective-defense principle and said the matter was ultimately up to President Donald Trump. Even if this was intended as leverage, the message was damaging because it blurred the line between disagreement over the ongoing war in Iran and the credibility of America’s broader security guarantee to Europe. Since these issues are linked, NATO begins to look less like a strategic community and more like a conditional bargain: support Washington when asked or face the consequences later. To make matters worse, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Washington should re-examine its security relations NATO after the war in Iran.

The American statements are particularly dangerous specifically for European states that are closest to Russia. Europe and Russia know that the value of NATO rests above all on the credibility of U.S. power. If Washington begins to imply that collective defense itself is open to political bargaining, then deterrence weakens. In this context, even if the immediate dispute is about Iran, the strategic audience includes Russia as well. That is why careless ambiguity on Article 5 has effects far beyond the Middle East (NATO 2025).

Also, the economic consequences of the war are pushing Europe toward greater caution. Recent reports suggest that the E.U. was considering reviving parts of its 2022 emergency energy toolkit because of the risk of prolonged market disruption linked to the war. This matters for transatlantic relations because it increases the domestic political cost, in Europe, of alignment with U.S. strategy. Even where direct dependence on Middle Eastern energy is lower than in previous decades, price shocks, shipping disruption, and market anxiety still hit European economies quickly. The longer that pressure continues, the harder it becomes for European governments to justify support for an open-ended conflict that they did not choose.

The result is a deeper shift in the political psychology of the alliance. Europe still depends on the U.S. for deterrence, logistics, intelligence, and high-end military capability. Nonetheless, it is increasingly unwilling to underwrite U.S. strategic decisions outside Europe without consultation, legal cover, and some sense of political control. This tension is not new, but the Iran war has exposed it more clearly than before.

Washington’s next moves

The U.S. is unlikely to totally abandon NATO even though President Trump has stated that he is considering of removing the U.S. form this “paper tiger” alliance. According to the Article 13 of NATO’s Treaty, a member state can withdraw one year after giving notice of denunciation (NATO 1949). The main obstacle however is the U.S. domestic law were the 2023-2024 FY2024 NDAA states the U.S. President cannot suspend, terminate, denounce or withdraw the U.S. from NATO unless the President has the consent of 2/3 of the Senate or an Act of Congress. In other words, the U.S. President cannot unilaterally withdraw Washington from NATO. But still the President has more room to pull the U.S. out of NATO’s integrated military structures, like France in 1966 and Greece in 1974, which is expected to have catastrophic result for the alliance’s credibility.

Let’s not forget that NATO is still one of the most efficient frameworks through which Washington projects military power in Europe and anchors deterrence against Russia. However, the U.S. might reshape the relationship with is European partners in unprecedent ways that make it harder, narrower, and more explicitly interest based. So, what we might expect next if not a total U.S. withdrawal from the alliance?

The first likely shift is toward a more demanding definition of allied reliability. European allies will increasingly be judged not only by whether they meet spending targets, but by whether they provide tangible support in a crisis: access to bases, overflight rights, logistical flexibility, and political backing when Washington sees a major strategic interest at stake.

The second shift will likely be toward more bilateral and subregional arrangements. If the Iran war has shown that alliance-wide access cannot be assumed, then Washington will seek more dependable channels with those allies that remain willing. That means stronger emphasis on countries that provide stable operational infrastructure, fewer assumptions about consensus, and a greater preference for concrete commitments over general declarations. In other words, NATO may remain the formal umbrella, but the operational core may become more selective or an “alliance withing the alliance”.

A third shift may be toward informal tiering inside NATO. This should not be presented as a formal NATO structure. There is no confirmed public document creating three official categories of allies. However, the reported U.S. discussions point toward a practical ranking of allies based on usefulness and cooperation. In this logic, the most valuable allies are those that spend more, provide access, allow overflight and basing, support U.S. operations, and align with Washington’s priorities beyond Europe. Allies that refuse access or political support may remain inside NATO, but they could face reduced trust, reduced influence, symbolic pressure, or even U.S. troop redeployments away from their territory. That is the real meaning of the reported “tiered” approach: not the legal division of NATO, but the political differentiation of allies. That said, Washington is likely to push harder on the idea that alliance solidarity must be reciprocal across theaters. This does not mean every ally will be forced to support every American involvement elsewhere, but it does mean the U.S. may increasingly link support for Europe’s security to broader expectations of European alignment. That would mark a serious change from the older transatlantic model, which often allowed a gap between U.S. military leadership and European political hesitation.

Europe’s Response

For Europe, this creates a difficult strategic reality. Many European governments want greater strategic autonomy, but autonomy requires capability. If Europe wants more freedom to say no to Washington in crises outside the NATO treaty framework, it will eventually need to carry more of the burden for security inside Europe. Otherwise, it risks falling into an unsustainable middle position: politically more distant from Washington, but militarily still dependent on it.

Spain is the clearest example of this dilemma. Madrid has tried to defend its position as a legal and political choice but not as an anti-NATO move. In this regard, the Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has downplayed the dispute with Washington and emphasized that Spain remains committed to cooperation within the limits of international law. However, the reported Pentagon email suggesting possible punitive measures against Spain shows how easily European refusal can be interpreted in Washington as disloyalty rather than strategic disagreement. This is important because Spain’s position may encourage other European governments to insist on clearer legal limits before supporting future U.S.-led operations outside Europe. At the same time, it may also expose them to stronger American pressure if Washington decides to link NATO solidarity with broader political alignment.

Germany represents the other side of Europe’s response. Berlin is not simply talking about autonomy; it is trying to build the military weight that autonomy requires. On April 22, 2026, Germany unveiled a new military strategy and reaffirmed the goal of expanding the Bundeswehr to 260,000 active personnel, with a broader force target of 460,000 including 200,000 reservists. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius also repeated Germany’s ambition to become Europe’s strongest conventional military force. This matters for NATO because Germany’s military development is no longer only a national modernization project. It is becoming part of Europe’s answer to a less predictable U.S. security guarantee.

This does not mean Europe is ready to replace the U.S. because it is not. Europe still depends heavily on U.S. intelligence, logistics, airlift, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, command-and-control, and high-end military capabilities. But the direction is changing. The new NATO spending commitment adopted at The Hague in 2025, which calls for allies to reach 5% of GDP annually by 2035, including 3.5% for core defense and 1.5% for broader defense- and security-related spending, shows that European defense planning is moving into a harder phase. The political argument is now being matched, slowly and unevenly, by a capability debate.

That is why the future of NATO after the Iran war is more likely to defined by gradual hardening. The alliance will survive, but with less trust, less automatic solidarity, and more explicit bargaining. The rhetoric may still be sometimes harsh but in practice it may increasingly revolve around access, leverage, burden-sharing, and strategic usefulness.

Conclusion

Consequently, the Iran war is not expected destroy the Atlantic alliance, but it has accelerated its political transformation. Washington will not walk away from Europe, but it may decide that it can no longer treat all European allies in the same way. Europe on the other hand has realized that they are no longer prepared to equate alliance membership with automatic support for American wars and thus they need to take care their own defense. That mutual recalibration is now underway.

The future of NATO, therefore, will depend less on public declarations than on whether Washington and Europe can rebuild a working balance between leadership and consent. If the U.S. tries to remake the alliance through pressure alone, it will deepen European hedging. If Europe demands autonomy without building the military capacity to support it, its room for independent action will remain limited. The alliance will endure, but the post-Iran-war version of it is likely to be narrower, tougher, and more transactional than the one that came before.

References

NATO. 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty. Washington, DC, April 4, 1949.

NATO. 2025. The Hague Summit Declaration. June 25, 2025.

NATO. 2025a. “Collective Defense and Article 5.” Last updated November 12, 2025.

Reuters. 2026a. “Europe Pushes Back on Some U.S. Military Operations as Concerns over Iran War Mount.” March 31, 2026.

Reuters. 2026b. “Pentagon Declines to Reaffirm NATO’s Collective Defense, Says Up to Trump.” March 31, 2026.

Reuters. 2026c. “EU May Revive 2022 Energy Crisis Measures in Response to Iran War.” March 31, 2026.

United States. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. Public Law 118-31. 137 Stat. 136. Enacted December 22, 2023.

Photo: Map of Ukraine, with Russian-occupied regions highlighted / Open source

Introduction

The Russia–Ukraine war has entered a phase in which endurance matters more than momentum. What matters now is not only the daily movement of the front line, but which side can continue absorbing military, economic, and political pressure for longer, and under what conditions that balance may shift by 2027.

At this stage, a simple prediction is not enough. What is needed is a structured assessment of plausible futures. In this paper, I draw on the scenario-building discipline associated with RANE/Stratfor-style analysis to examine the most plausible trajectories of the war through the end of 2027. The purpose is not to claim certainty, but to identify the principal drivers of change, outline the main scenarios, and highlight the indicators that may reveal which direction the conflict is taking.

Forecast question

What are the plausible trajectories of the Russia–Ukraine war between now and the end of 2027?

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GeoSec Insights Is 11 Months Old, and I Wanted to share something personal.

I still remember when this started mostly as an idea: a small independent space where I could write seriously about power, security, strategy, and the forces shaping the world. I did not know exactly how far it would go. The only thing I knew was that I wanted to build something with discipline, honesty, and a clear voice.

Eleven months later, GeoSec has become more real than I expected. More than 2,100 people have subscribed, more than 3,200 follow the platform, and readers now come from 118 countries. For an independent project-built step by step, this means a lot.

But numbers are not the whole story.

What matters more to me is that GeoSec has slowly become a place where I can bring together the things I care about: geopolitics, history, strategy, writing, and the deeper question of how power works in human life.

In one month, on June 19, GeoSec Insights will reach its first anniversary. To mark that moment, I will launch a new paid essay series:

Art & Power: Culture, Empire, and the Geopolitical Imagination

This series is personal to me. Before I studied international relations and political science, I studied culture. Art, literature, architecture, cinema, monuments, memory, these were never separate from politics in my mind. They were another way of understanding how societies imagine themselves, how states tell stories about power, and how empires try to make their authority feel natural, beautiful, eternal, or unavoidable.

With Art & Power, I want to open a more reflective space inside GeoSec.

The series will look at power not only through wars, borders, institutions, alliances, and strategy, but also through stone, images, stories, music, symbols, fear, ambition, beauty, and memory.

GeoSec will continue to publish geopolitical analysis, policy briefs, scenario assessments, and strategic forecasts. That remains the core of the platform. But as GeoSec enters its second year, I also want it to grow in a way that feels true to me.

In the coming weeks, I will share more details about the structure of the series and the essays that will follow. For now, I simply wanted to introduce the idea behind it and explain why it matters to me.

Thank you for being here during these first 11 months. Whether you have been reading from the beginning or only recently joined, your presence matters.

The first year is almost here.

And something new is coming.

Photo: National Institutes of Health (NIH), public domain

Scientific power does not collapse overnight, but once its foundations begin to weaken, the strategic consequences can last for decades

Key Takeaways

• Scientific research is a crucial but rather underexamined domain of the Great Power competition with long-term implications.

• The American scientific dominance has been declining because of closing openness and political interference in research institutions.

• China is on a state-driven research strategy which links science, industrial policy, and talent development.

• Historical precedents suggest that scientific leadership shifts over time and usually precedes wider geopolitical change.

• If the current trends continue, scientific research in global level can move from the West to a multipolar of Beijing driven context, reducing Washington’s influence over talent and innovation.

Issue Overview

Great Power competition is usually assessed through hard and soft power indicators such as military capabilities, economic scale, technological deployment, and political influence. At the same time, far less attention is paid to scientific research itself, even though it underpins all of these domains. For most of the 20th century, the United States was the world’s dominant scientific power. As the world’s science powerhouse, American universities attracted global talent, federal agencies funded long-term basic research, and an open academic culture produced breakthroughs ranging from the internet to modern biotechnology.

However, that position is now under strain. A growing body of evidence suggests that the U.S. research ecosystem is weakening because of internal policy choices, while China is expanding its scientific capacity through sustained investment and strategic coordination. This shift is gradual rather than sudden, but its implications are structural. Scientific leadership shapes who control knowledge flows, sets technical standards, and hosts future innovation clusters.

This policy brief examines the erosion of America’s scientific edge, China’s parallel rise, and the historical and strategic meaning of this transition, as from laboratories to lecture halls, the balance of global brainpower is shifting and the competition between great powers may take a different turn. This is undoubtedly a crucial indication for the future of global affairs. The historical paradigm is clear, even though history does not repeat itself: before World War I, the shift of power between the British Empire and the rising German state could already be seen in scientific research, as German institutions had begun to surpass the world-famous British ones.

Analysis. The Erosion of U.S. Scientific Dominance

Ross Andersen, in the article Every Scientific Empire Comes to an End[1], warns that American dominance in science and technology is entering a period of decline, fundamentally driven by self-inflicted policy decisions (Andersen 2025). He draws comparisons with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, arguing that political and ideological interference, budgetary pressure, institutional disruption, and immigration barriers can cause damage even to the most advanced research systems. Andersen suggests that these developments are pushing top scientists out of the country and weakening the backbone of scientific research. With more science shifting toward short-term, privately funded projects, the U.S. risks losing a generation of open, long-range inquiry, and with it, the edge that’s kept America ahead.

Some of these dynamics are already visible. Federal support remains a central pillar of the American research system, especially in higher education. In 2023, the federal government funded 55 percent of academic R&D expenditures, while 63 percent of academic R&D was devoted to basic research rather than near-market development (NCSES 2025a). This matters because universities and publicly supported research environments still provide much of the institutional space for long-range inquiry that is less likely to be sustained by commercial logic alone. At the same time, the broader U.S. R&D system is increasingly dominated by the private sector. Total U.S. R&D reached $937 billion in 2023, and a large share of that activity was concentrated in business-led research and especially experimental development rather than basic science (NCSES 2026; NCSES 2025b). The issue, therefore, is not that private capital has no role in scientific innovation. It is that private investment does not replace the public and academic base on which foundational research has historically depended (NCSES 2025a; NCSES 2026).

The international talent dimension is equally important. U.S. scientific leadership has relied for decades on the ability to attract foreign students, researchers, and faculty, particularly at the graduate level. That dependence remains substantial. In 2023, foreign-born workers accounted for 22 percent of the U.S. STEM workforce, and the United States still hosted the largest number of internationally mobile students in the world, even though its global share has declined since 2017 (NSB 2026). More importantly, the latest enrollment signals point to growing pressure on that pipeline. Open Doors 2025 reported that the United States hosted 1,177,766 international students in the 2024/25 academic year, but it also recorded a 7 percent drop in new international enrollments and a 3 percent decline in international graduate enrollment. The Fall 2025 Snapshot then showed a further 1 percent decline in total international enrollment, a 12 percent drop in graduate enrollment, and a 17 percent decline in new international student enrollment (IIE 2025a; IIE 2025b). For a research system that depends heavily on internationally mobile graduate talent, these are not marginal shifts. They point to a weakening inflow at exactly the stage most closely linked to the future research workforce.

Visa policy has become part of that problem. In March 2026, NAFSA reported that F-1 visa issuance during May through August 2025 was 36 percent lower than in the same period a year earlier (NAFSA 2026). That figure should be treated carefully, since visa issuance does not translate automatically into final enrollment totals. Still, the broader signal is difficult to ignore. When the United States becomes more restrictive, less predictable, or more administratively burdensome for foreign students and scholars, it weakens one of the key advantages that long sustained its scientific leadership. In a more competitive global environment, scientific prestige is no longer enough by itself. It must be reinforced by policy coherence and institutional predictability (NAFSA 2026; NSB 2026).

Last, Washington intervention in prestige American institutions regarding their governance, redirection of their scientific research topics and their ideological realignment, will further erode stability (Andersen 2025). The actual power of the American scientific system is based historically on a combination of federal support, university autonomy, openness to global talent, and a decentralized research culture capable of sustaining inquiry across fields without constant political realignment. Once that balance begins to weaken, the damage is rarely immediate, but it is cumulative. The deeper risk for the United States is not simply fewer discoveries in the short term. It is the erosion of the institutional foundations that made American scientific dominance possible in the first place (Andersen 2025).

China’s Rising Scientific Capacity. Shifting Patterns of Scientific Collaboration

At the same time, China is moving in the opposite direction. Its rise is not limited to industrial output. It is increasingly visible in science itself. Research on global chemical space shows that China has driven much of its expansion since 2013, while the U.S. position has stagnated in several areas. Chinese universities have also strengthened their global standing. In the Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2026, Tsinghua University ranked 12th and Peking University 13th, confirming that elite Chinese institutions are now central actors in the global research landscape (Bermúdez-Montaña et al. 2025; Times Higher Education 2025).

The same pattern is now visible in scientific collaboration. China is not simply publishing more. It is also becoming more influential inside international research networks. Recent studies show that Chinese scholars have sharply reduced the leadership gap with the United States in collaborative scientific teams, and some projections suggest parity in bilateral leadership roles by 2027–2028 (Wu, Esposito, and Evans 2025). Meanwhile, U.S.–China scientific collaboration is no longer moving on the path of convergence that defined earlier decades. Since around 2018–2019, the two sides have started to diverge, with collaboration shrinking and knowledge flows gradually realigning (Kitajima and Okamura 2025). This points to something deeper than a temporary fluctuation. China is consolidating both its domestic scientific base and its international influence, while the United States risks losing ground in one of the most important arenas of long-term competition.

The History Parallels. Germany Before World War I

Historical precedent highlights the significance of these trends. At the turn of the 20th century, Imperial Germany became the global leader of science as it dominated in fields like physical chemistry, theoretical physics, and Nobel‑winning research. German institutions attracted top global talent until political upheaval and Nazi interference dismantled that system, forcing scientists like Einstein, von Neumann, Fermi to emigrate to the U.S. This transfer of scientific capital boosted the Americans’ rise as the world’s top scientific power.

Nowadays is obvious that the U.S. is facing a different political context but a comparable dynamic as self-imposed restrictions risk driving scientific capital abroad. China today has positioned itself to attract that scientific capital just as Washington did almost 100 years ago.

Structural Trends and Quantitative Signals

Long-term analyses reinforce the possibility of a systemic shift. Academic M. Yuasa suggested that centers of scientific excellence shift every 80–100 years, moving historically from Italy to Britain, France, Germany, and eventually the U.S. This pattern suggests that a natural cycle now shifting toward China which reflects a structural cycle and not a sudden failure.

At the same time, macro-level studies warn that scientific disruption, truly breakthrough innovation, is slowing globally, even in high-output systems. An analysis of millions of papers and patents shows a persistent decline in “disruptive” innovation, raising concerns about scientific vitality in general, even in the U.S (Park, Leahey & Funk 2021). This suggests that institutional resilience is more important than ever before. In the context where breakthroughs are more difficult to generate, systems that sustain the attraction of top global talent gain significant strategic advantage.

Erosion at the Base: U.S. Education and the Research Pipeline

The weakening of U.S. scientific capacity does not begin at the level of elite laboratories or federal research agencies. It starts much earlier, in the education pipeline itself. Recent results from the National Assessment of Educational Progress show that American students are reaching the end of secondary education with weaker core skills than in previous years. In 2024, average twelfth-grade scores in both mathematics and reading fell by three points compared with 2019, and the average scores in both subjects were the lowest ever recorded for those assessments. Only 24 percent of twelfth graders performed at or above NAEP Proficient in mathematics, while 37 percent did so in reading (NAEP 2024). These outcomes matter well beyond K–12 education because they shape the entry quality into higher education especially in STEM. There, the weak preparation in mathematics continues to narrow the pool of students able to persist in demanding programs. Thus, the major issue is not merely access to college, but the academic readiness required to move through it successfully.

International data reinforces this concern, though they also require precision. In PISA 2022, the United States scored 465 in mathematics, below the OECD average of 472, while scoring 504 in reading and 499 in science, both above OECD averages. Even so, U.S. performance in mathematics remained well behind the strongest systems, particularly in East Asia and several European cases, and was lower than its own 2018 level (OECD 2023). The broader strategic issue is that the United States still possesses world-class universities and research institutions, but its domestic talent pipeline is under growing strain. That weakness increases the importance of foreign-born talent at precisely the moment when the country’s STEM system remains deeply dependent on it: according to the National Science Board, foreign-born workers accounted for 22 percent of the U.S. STEM workforce in 2023, and earlier NSF reporting showed they made up 43 percent of doctorate-level scientists and engineers. At the same time, STEM persistence remains uneven. As of 2021, only 55 percent of students who entered postsecondary education with a declared STEM major had completed a STEM credential, while 29 percent had left college without any degree. The result is a structural problem rather than a temporary fluctuation: weaker preparation at the school level constrains the production of homegrown researchers, while continued dependence on internationally mobile talent leaves the system more exposed to policy shocks, visa uncertainty, and geopolitical competition over highly skilled labor.

Policy Options

In this context, policy makers face several policy options:

1. Stabilization and potential expansion of federal funding for basic research insulated from short-term political cycles.

2. Make America attractive again to global scientific talent by easing visa restrictions and reducing surveillance-driven deterrence.

3. Protection of institutional autonomy which includes both institutions and research facilities/agencies.

4. Rebalancing collaboration controls to manage security risks without eliminating scientific exchange.

Other Recommendations

• Scientific research should be treated as strategic asset, not as discretionary spending.

• National Security enforcement should be separated from broad academic oversight.

• Prioritization of long-term research capacity.

• Tracking scientific indicators as defense and economic metrics.

• Targeted reinvestment in pre-college education (especially on fields like STEM) should become a top federal educational priority.

Conclusion. Toward a Multipolar Scientific Order?

In conclusion, if these trends persist in the future, global science will probably shift from the American dominance toward a more multipolar system in which China will have a central role. This could mark a structural shift as scientific leadership changes slowly, but once momentum is lost, it is difficult to recover.

America’s rise as the world’s leading scientific power that was based on a specific model: sustained federal investment in basic research, institutional autonomy for universities, and an unusually open system for attracting global talent. For much of the postwar period, this model worked remarkably well, and the U.S. unquestionably dominated high-impact research output, hosted the majority of top-ranked universities, and absorbed scientific talent displaced by political instability elsewhere.

However, these foundations are now weakening. Federal research funding as a share of GDP has declined steadily since its Cold War peak, and real growth in basic research budgets has failed to keep pace with system-wide expansion. In this regard, American institutions still produce world-class research, but their relative position is shifting as other institutions, notably Chinese, are rising fast in respected global rankings and publication volume. At the same time, immigration restrictions have reduced the U.S. attractiveness to global talent especially regarding early-career scientists.

China on the other hand is committed to long-term, state-backed investments in engineering and science. Thus, China is linking fundamental research with applied development under a broader industrial strategy. Nowadays, Chinese institutions graduate more STEM PhDs annually than the American institutions while China is leading globally in total scientific publications with increasingly citation impact. Also, the return of Chinese-trained scientists has accelerated, reversing decades of one-way talent flow.

Scientific leadership cannot be translated into geopolitical dominance overnight. However, in time it can significantly reshape industrial competitiveness, military capability and normative influence over global standards and knowledge production. If history follows its near-cyclical rhythms, the U.S. may already be past the apex of its scientific dominance. China’s ascent, by contrast, is still unfolding, driven less by momentary advantage than by sustained policy choice.

The outcome is not predetermined but absent deliberate efforts to restore funding stability, talent openness, and institutional autonomy, the balance of global scientific power is likely to continue shifting. The consequences of that shift will be felt well beyond laboratories and institutions.

References

Andersen, Ross. “Every Scientific Empire Comes to an End: America’s Run as the Premier Techno-Superpower May Be Over.” The Atlantic, July 31, 2025.

Bermúdez-Montaña, Marisol, et al. “China’s Rise in the Chemical Space and the Decline of US Influence.” ChemRxiv, January 27, 2025.

Institute of International Education (IIE). 2025a. Open Doors 2025 Report on International Educational Exchange. New York: IIE.

Institute of International Education (IIE). 2025b. Fall 2025 Snapshot on International Student Enrollment: Key Findings. New York: IIE, November 2025.

Kitajima, Kensei, and Keisuke Okamura. “The Altering Landscape of US–China Science Collaboration: From Convergence to Divergence.” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 12 (2025).

NAFSA: Association of International Educators. 2026. “NAFSA Responds to Decline in F-1 Visa Issuance in Summer 2025.” March 2026.

National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). 2024. Declines in 12th-Grade Mathematics and Reading Continue. National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education.

National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES). 2025a. “Funding Sources of Academic R&D.” National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2026. Alexandria, VA: National Science Foundation.

National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES). 2025b. National Patterns of R&D Resources, 2023–24: Data Update. Alexandria, VA: National Science Foundation.

National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES). 2026. “U.S. R&D Totaled $937 Billion in 2023.” National Science Foundation, February 27, 2026.

National Science Board (NSB). 2026. The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2026. Alexandria, VA: National Science Foundation.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2023. PISA 2022 Results: The State of Learning and Equity in Education. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Park, Michael, Erin Leahey, and Russell Funk. “The Decline of Disruptive Science and Technology.” Nature 613 (2023): 138–144.

Times Higher Education. 2025. World University Rankings 2026. London: Times Higher Education.

Wu, Renli, Christopher Esposito, and James A. Evans. “Shifting Power Asymmetries in Scientific Teams Reveal China’s Rising Leadership in Global Science.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 122, no. 43 (2025).

[1] https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2025/07/science-empire-america-decline/683711/

Photo: President Trump / Official White House Photo

I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that ‘for God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about communism... he’s got his hand on the nuclear button and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in for it.

President Nixon

Executive Summary

Donald Trump’s recent rhetoric toward Iran has revived an old strategic debate in a much sharper form than the U.S.-China trade war ever did. His April 7, 2026, warning that “a whole civilization will die tonight” if Iran did not make a deal, was definitely not routine diplomatic language. It was deliberately framed in a maximalist way to underline the fact that the U.S., under his presidency, might be willing to go further than any other leader would openly dare to. This matters as it fits to the logic behind the Madman Theory1 which suggests that a leader can gain leverage by convincing the opponents that he/she might be less predictable and thus more willing to escalate unexpectantly (Reuters 2026a).

In this paper we argue that President Trump’s current rhetoric offers a stronger case for the Madman Theory than the older tariff-war example. The trade war showed a preference for disruption, abrupt pressure, and strategic uncertainty. But the current Iran war moved that style into a far more dangerous setting, where the language of coercion was no longer about tariffs, market pressure, or negotiation tactics, but about civilizational destruction. That shift matters analytically because it shows the same strategic instinct operating at a much higher level of risk (Reuters 2026a; Reuters 2026b).

At the same time, the very rhetoric that may create short-term fear abroad also creates new political costs at home. Trump’s opponents have again turned to the language of presidential incapacity and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, not because removal is realistically within reach, but because his recent statements have reopened the debate over whether his conduct reflects strategic calculation or dangerous unfitness for office. Reuters reported on April 10 that Representative Jamie Raskin plans to reintroduce legislation for a presidential-capacity commission, while a separate Reuters explainer noted that some Democrats are again discussing whether Trump is fit to discharge the duties of office. Yet the constitutional threshold remains extremely high, and Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has never been used to remove a president involuntarily (Reuters 2026c; Reuters 2026d; Congress.gov 2026).

The central conclusion is straightforward. President Trump’s recent rhetoric does resemble the Madman Theory. It may still generate tactical leverage by creating fear and compressing the opponent’s decision-making space. However, the constant use of this strategy bears significant costs, which we have witnessed so far, as it damages credibility, strengthens domestic opposition, unsettle close allies and finally makes even harder to recognize deliberate coercion from impulsive escalation. In this regard, what starts as a strategic unpredictability can become a strategic overextension.

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Photo: Munich Security Conference 2026/ Public domain

The war unfolding around Iran is not only a regional escalation; it is occurring at a moment when the foundations of the post-1945 international order are already under strain. The international system built on multilateral institutions, democratic alignment and open trade has been challenged by the raise of powers that favor disruption over reform. As the Munich Security Report 2026 suggests, global affairs are entering an era of wrecking ball politics, where demolition is the first choice. In this context, the Iran war underscores not only a regional instability but mostly the broader transition towards a more fragmented international system where power prevails over rules.

Key Takeaways

• The post 1945 world order is undergoing active dismantling which is driven by political forces which favor disruption than reform. This period is characterized as wrecking ball politics, which is described in the Munich Security Report 2026, where demolition and rupture have replaced renovation and incremental adjustment.

• The U.S. as the fundamental architect and guarantor of the post-war international order, is now shifting away from multilateralism, open trade and liberal democratic norms. This recalibration is deep as it questions the foundational logic that international institutions, rules, and alliances enhance rather than constrain national power.

• Due to this strategic uncertainty, Europe and the Indo-Pacific states are forced in strategic adjusting through defense acceleration, hedging behavior, and new trade alignments.

• Global trade fragmentation is increasing; however, liberal economic cooperation has not yet collapsed. Instead, it has been re-networked outside traditional U.S. leadership structures, often through regional or multilateral frameworks anchored in WTO law even as enforcement mechanisms weaken.

• The emerging system favors leverage over law. However, without material backing the rules are eroding. Thus, the defining question for 2026 is whether rule-invested actors can convert commitment into capability before erosion becomes normalization.

Issue Overview

The Munich Security Report of 2026 argues that the international system is currently under destruction. This argument highlights the current structural shift is about how political authority is exercised both internationally and domestically. In this context, political actors are increasingly promoting demolition instead of reform which is considered progressively insufficient.

That said, across the Western world, institutional reform has lost its political credibility. Survey data from the Munich Security Index indicates that in the G7 states, only small minorities believe that current government policies will eventually leave the next generation in better position than today. At the same time, the majority of the surveyed expect significant decline. This loss of faith reflects skepticism that democratic systems can deliver meaningful course correction.

The current political situation has produced leaders who are in favor of destruction as a necessity rather than risk. Furthermore, institutional constraints are portrayed as bureaucratic stagnation while multilateral commitments are described as sovereignty dilution. International rules are reframed as optional instruments rather than binding frameworks. Thus, the most important development is that this governing logic has extended to the international order itself.

For approximately 80 years, the postwar system rested on three interlocking assumptions:

1. Multilateral institutions and international law secure stability.

2. Open trade and economic interdependence support prosperity and reduce conflict.

3. Democratic solidarity strengthens collective security.

Munich 2026 claims that these pillars of the postwar international order are not facing episodic disagreements but structural strain. The current transition concerns contestation over the framework itself.

Evidence & Analysis

Multilateralism and International Law. From Constraint to Optionality

The report refers to a clear shift regarding Washington’s posture towards international institutions. Withdrawals from key organizations and agreements, significant reduction of funding, and intense skepticism regarding global governance structures marks a redefinition of national interest. The U.S. National Security Strategy 2025 emphasizes the primacy of nations while it criticizes the sovereignty-sapping international organizations.

Also important is the normative shift as previous U.S. administrations justified deviations from the International Law via legal reasoning. However, the current U.S. administration has been direct as international norms and rules are not inherently binding in case they conflict with the express American strategic priorities. The risk is a potential normalization of rule-optional behavior. Once great powers detach rhetorical commitment from legal constraint, medium or even smaller powers reassess their own incentives to comply. This does not immediately collapse the system, but it will weaken predictability, which is the cornerstone of order.

Open Trade. Fragmentation Without Systemic Breakdown

Trade policies have become an instrument of leverage-based bargaining rather than a domain of predictable liberalization. The report underlines the imposition of broad tariffs and increasing reliance on economic coercion to secure bilateral concessions. At the same time, Beijing continues market-distorting practices and strategic control over key supply chains chokepoints.

The system is therefore pressured from both ends, yet fragmentation does not equal collapse. The data suggests that a surge in new and revived trade negotiations outside direct US leadership as governments are doubling down on trade agreements anchored in WTO principles even as enforcement mechanisms weaken.

This is a critical nuance as the liberal trade architecture has been redistributed across regional and plurilateral networks. WTO principles still anchor many agreements even as dispute settlement mechanisms are significantly weakened.

The implication is structural diversification rather than systemic implosion. Liberal economic order persists, but leadership is decentralized. Fragmentation increases complexity and reduces uniformity, yet it also reduces systemic dependency on a single hegemon.

Democratic Solidarity. The West as Geography, Not Norm

Public opinion data in NATO member states indicate that majorities perceive the West as less united than a decade ago. This perception reflects an ideological divergence. Rhetorical friction between the U.S. and the European allies has sharpened. European governments have expressed concern about disregarding established rules and partnerships.

At the same time, softer rhetoric toward authoritarian leaders alters alliance psychology. The cohesion of the transatlantic relationship historically rested on shared normative framing. When that relationship becomes contested, alignment shifts from identity-based alignment to interest-based calculation. It does not mean that NATO dissolves under such circumstances, however, its cooperation basis becomes transactional. This distinction is important as identity creates automatic alignment while transactional alignment requires continuous renegotiation.

Europe. Acceleration Through Uncertainty

The Europeans are facing a dual dynamic as the ongoing Russian military pressure and the fluctuating of the American strategic signaling. Especially, Washington’s approach is perceived as oscillating between reassurance, conditionality, and coercion.

This combination has resulted in accelerating defense spending commitments and renewed emphasis on capability building which Europe obviously lacks. NATO’s agreement on higher spending targets (5% of GDP) highlights that adaptation is under pressure. Yet capability gap between the U.S. and Europeans remain significant especially in high-end military assets and strategic enablers.

In this strategic environment, the European leaders are not necessarily seeking strategic independence for ideological reasons, but they are trying to adjust to the new realities. Strategic autonomy, once aspirational, now appears as risk mitigation. This shift is gradual but real. Capability accumulation takes time while political will, withing the EU, is still uneven. Nonetheless, the trajectory is moving toward partial decoupling of security dependence.

Indo-Pacific. Hedging as Strategy

Regarding the Indo-Pacific region, the strategic uncertainty leads to hedging rather than that alignment. Regional actors have significantly increased defense budgets while they deepen security cooperation while they maintain a pragmatic approach to China as far as the economic ties are concerned.

In contrast to Europe, institutional fallback mechanisms are limited while the region also lacks the presence of a NATO-like guaranteed structure. This lack of collective defense mechanism boosts strategic ambiguity.

The regional pattern is layered balancing:

• Strengthening bilateral defense cooperation.

• Avoid full strategic alignment.

• Preserve economic flexibility.

Development and Humanitarian Strain

Even before current disruptions, the world was off track on all 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Funding retrenchment deepens structural gaps. Reform conversations focus on efficiency and survival rather than expansion. Humanitarian architecture operates under financial compression. The long-term consequence is increased vulnerability in low- and middle-income states. While not immediately destabilizing at a systemic level, accumulated fragility can produce second-order geopolitical effects over time.

Risk Perception. Psychological Decentering of the United States

The Munich Security Index highlights a significant shift as in most of the surveyed states, the perceived risk related to the U.S. has increased. Moreover, less than 50% of the responders claim that Washington’s leadership is necessary for solving major global challenges like financial stability, conflict resolution and climate change. In other words, the U.S. remains powerful and important global actor however, its perception as indispensable is declining which indicates a broader strategic shift.

Policy Options

The report underscores the pressure and the responses which are already underway. That said, several options are available for states that still prefer a ruled-based international order.

Option 1. Secure Crucial International Institutions through Coalitions

As we have noticed, the international consensus is significantly declining, thus smaller coalitions can preserve international cooperation in areas like trade and security. These forms of international cooperation can be deepened among like-minded actors. This development can preserve operability but not replace universalism.

Option 2. Invest in Material Capability

Normative commitments are insufficient without actual capability. Defense modernization, technological competitiveness, and supply-chain resilience are foundational to preserving leverage within a power-first environment. Institutions require backing power.

Option 3. Reform to Restore Credibility

Public skepticism toward democratic governance is a driver of demolition politics. The address of institutional performance, governance inefficiency, economic stagnation, and inequality, is fundamental in international order preservation because external stability rests on internal legitimacy.

Option 4. Diversify Strategic Partnerships

States can reduce their overdependence on specific actors by widening their economic and diplomatic relations. This can reduce their vulnerability to abrupt policy shifts by great powers as diversification is actually risk management.

Recommendations

1. Shift from reactive to anticipatory strategy. Preparation for volatility/uncertainty rather than assuming restoration of past stability.

2. Prioritization capability accumulation over rhetorical defense of norms. Norms without enforcement weaken quickly.

3. Strengthen regional frameworks as buffers. Regional resilience can compensate for global fragmentation.

4. Link domestic reform to foreign policy credibility. Internal governance performance affects external leverage.

Conclusion

Munich 2026 captures the ongoing structural transition of the international system. The latter is not collapsing but it is shifting from rules-first system toward power-first. This shift is driven by domestic political frustration, recalibrated great-power strategy, and growing skepticism toward institutional efficacy. In this context, fragmentation is increasing, however, global order has not yet been dissolved. Slowly but steadily trade networks are adapting while regional coalitions are forming. Additionally, due to the uncertainty, investments in defense have dramatically raised.

The decisive variable is whether actors committed to rule-based stability convert commitment into capability. If they do, the system evolves into a hybrid structure: less universal, more regional, but still governed by predictable frameworks in key domains. If they do not, leverage will define outcomes more than law. The transition is underway while the question is who adapts first, and who adapts effectively. Munich 2026 does not predict collapse but instead it diagnoses inflection. That distinction matters.

References

https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report/2026/

Photo: Radar installation at Pituffik Space Base in northwestern Greenland. Source: U.S. Space Force / Department of Defense, Public Domain

Greenland is no longer a remote Arctic outpost; it is becoming a quiet stress test for NATO itself. As climate change accelerates access, U.S. homeland-defense priorities increasingly shape Arctic decision-making, and European allies struggle to match strategic responsibility with capability, Greenland sits at the intersection of alliance cohesion, deterrence credibility, and great-power competition. This February 2026 risk report examines why the real danger is not an Arctic war, but a gradual erosion of collective defense through unilateralism, gray-zone pressure, and institutional lag. For policymakers, defense planners, and strategic investors, this analysis explains what is already shifting beneath the surface, and what to watch next.

Introduction: Greenland’s Return to Power Politics

Once dismissed as a frozen outpost on the edge of the world, Greenland is suddenly burning hot in the great game of global power. Its ice, its location, and its resources have transformed the island into one of the most strategically sensitive territories in the Arctic system. What was long treated as geopolitical background noise has become a central variable in great-power competition and alliance politics.

Greenland constitutes an Arctic island state belonging to the Kingdom of Denmark while enjoying extensive self-government, including its own parliament and executive authority. Its population, estimated at approximately 56,000 inhabitants in 2020, is concentrated primarily along the western coastline, with around 12,000 residents in Nuuk, the capital. Geographically located in North America and bordering the Arctic Ocean, Greenland is defined by its environment: roughly 81 percent of its surface is permanently covered by ice.

Until recently, the island concerned the international public primarily as a travel destination or for environmental reasons since, due to its geographic position, it serves as an excellent indicator of climate change. The global temperature rise causes ice melting, resulting in a chain of negative environmental impacts across the planet. The deep concern of scientists, NGOs, and global public opinion about the climate is not shared by several governments and companies, as the melting of Arctic ice creates opportunities both in trade and in energy, as we will see below. Due to its location, Greenland is part of the geopolitical system of the Arctic, which has recently attracted the interest of the Great Powers.

For a number of governments and corporations, the retreat of Arctic ice created opportunity rather than alarm. New shipping routes, access to fossil fuels, and the prospect of rare earth extraction reframed the Arctic as a frontier of economic and strategic competition. Greenland, by virtue of its geography, was pulled into this shift whether it sought it or not.

Today, Greenland is no longer merely part of the Arctic system. It is becoming one of its key pressure points. That development has direct consequences for NATO, an alliance that has long benefited from Arctic stability without ever fully governing it.

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Photo: Aerial view of an LNG terminal with storage tanks and a docked LNG carrier/ Open Source

Europe did not only replaced Russian gas oil with LNG but it actually rewired its whole energy security architecture. Thus, what has emerged since 2022 is not just autonomy but rather a new system of managed interdependence shaped by long term infrastructure commitments, maritime chokepoints and the global markets. LNG has stabilized Europe in crisis but it has introduced new strategic exposures like the dependence on sea routes, Washington’s export capacity and the regulatory execution speed within Europe.

The real question regarding European security is no longer supply sufficiency but whether this LNG based system strengthens resilience or forces Europe into a new set of geopolitical constraints.

Energy security is not only about supply volumes, but about power, structure and control. The abrupt reduction of Russian flows exposed the extent to which European energy security relied on single-direction pipeline systems and demonstrated how infrastructure can function as a geopolitical instrument. Europe’s response was immediate: diversification of suppliers, rapid LNG deployment, new terminals, new transmission routes. Systemic disruption was avoided. However, replacing pipeline gas with LNG does not automatically produce autonomy. What has emerged is a new energy geometry shaped by global markets, maritime corridors, multiple exporting states and reconfigured internal transmission systems. The central question is not whether LNG replaced Russian gas but the strategic system Europe has constructed in its place.

Managed interdependence

European energy security underwent a structural shock during 2022–2023. Until then, Russian pipeline gas had accounted for roughly 40% of EU imports. Supply reductions exposed the vulnerability of natural gas pipelines as a single-direction system. LNG operates under a different structural logic.

Pipeline networks are geographically fixed and dependent on bilateral routes. LNG is mobile while its pricing is linked to future markets, between domestic gas costs and international availability and broader supply and demand.

In structural terms, LNG transforms gas from a route-bound commodity into a globally traded energy system. However, LNG flexibility does not eliminate exposure. Key maritime ports such as Suez and Bab el-Mandeb become critical since LNG requires operationally uninterrupted sea transport, or deliveries to Europe can be delayed within days.

Europe moved from reliance on a single dominant supplier to managed interdependence across multiple exporters, including the United States, Qatar, Algeria and intermittently Nigeria. A significant portion of European gas consumption now depends on US liquefaction capacity.

Although exports operate within market logic, they remain embedded in domestic regulatory and political frameworks. Upstream production decisions and export policies therefore influence European supply balance. Energy security is defined by system architecture and exposure management.

LNG: stabilizer or transitional layer

The European Commission’s REPowerEU initiative accelerated LNG infrastructure expansion, including Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs), to increase import capacity. Storage policy shifted from commercial optimization to strategic buffering.

In the short term, LNG strengthened energy systems security by offering high storage levels, additional import capacity, and diversified supply contracts which boost operational flexibility.

LNG infrastructure requires large-scale capital expenditure and operates over several decades not only in terms of payoff but also of contracts that further influence the long-term role of gas under transition policy regulations. A broader mix of contracts reduces the risk that a disruption from one supplier would trigger immediate shortages. Investment decisions under crisis can determine long-term system configuration, creating inconsistencies between supply security and energy security, the latter of which passes through sustainability in the case of the EU.

LNG acts as a bridge fuel with geopolitical significance and system-level implications for infrastructure alignment, sustainability targets that refer not only to climate but also to resilience, and long-term energy system design. The duration of LNG’s role depends on structural substitution pathways.

European policy implications

Diversification must be embedded in system design. Procurement should avoid overconcentration on any single exporter, because resilience depends on distributed supply rather than substituting one dependency with another.

Infrastructure resilience is equally strategic. LNG terminals, pipelines, and control systems require physical and cyber protection within EU security planning. System reliability depends not only on volumes, but on continuous operability. Maritime access remains a technical prerequisite for LNG supply stability. Secure sea lanes therefore link energy security directly to naval presence and diplomatic capacity.

Contract arrangements must support decarbonization pathways. Since LNG infrastructure operates over decades, flexibility is necessary to avoid locking the system into volumes that may exceed future demand.

Regional hubs can strengthen redistribution capacity beyond LNG. Greece, positioned between LNG and future energy entry points and Southeast European transmission networks, facilitates northbound reallocation during supply stress and enhances cross-border stability.

Even if LNG demand declines over time, the need for flexible cross-border flow remains. Integrating energy hubs into a coordinated EU structure strengthens internal system balance and joint negotiating capacity, ensuring that LNG, while transitional, is used efficiently and consistently across the Union.

EU innovation and structural exit

While LNG remains essential for European security of supply, the EU has developed a policy architecture that aims to fundamentally reduce gas dependence through demand reduction, diversification, and accelerated deployment of low-carbon energy systems. REPowerEU placed storage as a strategic buffer rather than an optimisation tool. Currently, innovation is treated not only as technological breakthroughs but also as implementation at scale: ensuring demand flexibility, electrifying technically viable sectors, expanding renewable power generation, utilising advanced biofuels, and developing hydrogen production and transport infrastructure to substitute natural gas in industry and heavy transport.

The key constraint in the adoption of new energy technologies is implementation that can accelerate uptake. Permitting procedures, grid expansion, hydrogen backbone development, and industrial transformation timelines remain underlying bottlenecks. In several member states, renewable and grid approvals still require years. Hydrogen projects face infrastructure gaps, fragmented frameworks, and delayed decisions, as in the implementation of REDIII (Renewable Energy Directive III). Biofuel scale-up depends on feedstock consistency and enhanced conversion technologies. Without regulatory speed in authorising innovative technologies for market reach, well-planned and coordinated infrastructure, especially across borders, and matched industrial acceptance, natural gas and consequently LNG substitution cannot scale at the necessary pace. Otherwise, LNG remains systemically relevant regardless of strategic objectives.

The EU possesses substantial instruments, including Horizon Europe and industrial frameworks supporting net-zero manufacturing. Still, a translation gap persists between research participation and deployment at industrial scale, not due to patent filing or research output, but due to the shift from intellectual property to physical implementation. Moving from IP to permitting, financing, integration, and industrial deployment involves time lags, bureaucracy, and regulatory requirements. Administrative complexity, fragmented markets, infrastructure constraints, and slow financing approvals delay implementation and slow system transformation.

Bureaucracy thus becomes a geopolitical variable. Slow delivery prolongs reliance on gas and LNG. The constraint to the EU’s energy security is not technological capability, but execution speed, infrastructure alignment, and institutional coordination and effectiveness.

Author Bio

*Dr. Panagiota Pimenidou is a Chemical Engineer with a PhD in hydrogen production from the University of Leeds and extensive academic experience in the UK and Greece. She has held academic posts at Ulster University and the University of Bradford and currently contributes to EU-funded research projects on sustainable fuels and advanced materials. Her research focuses on low-carbon fuels, hydrogen technologies, catalyst development and emissions reductions, with particular emphasis on process evaluation and validation, fuel performance, and the technical challenges associated with transitioning energy systems toward lower-carbon pathways.

Bibliography (indicative)

Bruegel. (2022). A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis (Policy Contribution). Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/PC%2014%202022_0.pdf

European Commission. (2022). REPowerEU plan (COM(2022) 230 final). European Commission. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022DC0230

European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG). (2023). Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP). ENTSOG. https://www.entsog.eu/tyndp

International Energy Agency. (2025). Gas market lessons from the 2022–2023 energy crisis. IEA. https://www.iea.org/reports/gas-market-lessons-from-the-2022-2023-energy-crisis

Yafimava, K., Ason, A., & Fulwood, M. (2025). The EU proposal to ban Russian gas imports: Roadblock more than roadmap (NG 199). Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/The-EU-Proposal-To-Ban-Russian-Gas-Imports-roadblock-more-than-roadmap-NG-199.pdf

European Parliament & Council of the European Union. (2023). Renewable Energy Directive (EU) 2023/2413 (RED III). Official Journal of the European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32023L2413

1. Executive Summary

On January 3, 2026, the United States conducted a military operation in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, which resulted the capture of the country’s President Nicolas Maduro and his wife. U.S. authorities officially stated that this operation’s aim was to enforce the criminal indictments issued by American courts against N. Maduro regarding narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism financing. After the successful operation, Maduro and his wife transferred to a military base near New York City to stand trial in U.S. federal court.

This operation is one of the most consequential unilateral uses of force by the U.S. since the end of the Cold War and the most direct intervention in Latin America in decades. While some governments welcomed the removal form power of an active President, who is widely seen as a corrupted dictator, the method employed by the U.S. introduces a fundamental systemic risk to international norms governing sovereignty, the use of force and jurisdiction.

This report assesses the consequences of this operation at a global level regarding seven main domains:

The international legal order

Great-Power competition

Regional security in Latin America

Global economic and energy stability,

International institutions and norms,

Terrorism and transnational crime and

Sector specific implications.

Our analysis draws on International Law, historical precedent and strategic risk frameworks used by both governments and multinational corporations.

The main finding is that the operation’s risk on the long-term lies more in precedent erosion than in immediate military escalation. That said, the U.S. has blurred the foundational boundaries in International Relations by conducting, instead of a direct armed conflict, a cross-border military action as law enforcement. If this course of action is replicated by other powers, this logic could lower the threshold regarding unilateral interventions at a global level, increase geopolitical instability and weaken the predictability on which is based the economic, diplomatic and corporate decision-making.

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Photo by Andreas Gucklhorn

Our modern industrialized world has thrived in the last 100 years on a simple assumption: energy would be endless, cheap and secure. Obviously, this is not the case anymore. The concept of climate change, economic, political and social instability, wars and decarbonization efforts have been forcing nations into a complex transition. What comes next is not merely a technological shift, but a geopolitical transformation with consequences that will reverberate from the Persian Gulf to the Arctic Circle.

Modern society has staked its future on energy. For decades, the prosperity of the industrialized world was secured by the steady availability of fossil fuels, and we behaved as if these resources were inexhaustible. The abundance and characteristics made them easy to store and capable of delivering large amounts of energy efficiently and consistently. However, the urgent need to reduce emissions and environmental impact, together with various geopolitical factors, has led in recent years to restrictions on their availability and use.

Armed conflicts and political crises have repeatedly exposed the vulnerability of global fuel supplies. At the same time, societies have become aware of the environmental consequences of our dependence on fossil fuels. The era of fossil fuels as an energy source is coming to an end. As states are struggling to achieve the long-term objective of net-zero carbon emissions, renewable energy sources are poised to reshape the geopolitical landscape. Unlike oil and natural gas, electricity is traded regionally. Over the last 15 years, solar and wind power have experienced exponential growth, from being almost nonexistent to contributing 15% of the world’s electricity generation. At the same time, solar panel prices have dropped by as much as 90%.

Nevertheless, during the energy transition period, ensuring supply security, affordability and sustainability are simultaneous objectives. However, during periods of economic downturn, sustainability frequently becomes a secondary priority. A combination of affordability and security, facilitated by energy access, ensures a sufficient supply at reasonable prices.

That said, the transition to another stage of energy will be challenging while we have already been experiencing the effects. The development of an industrial sector that is solely dependent on renewable energy is more costly and technically challenging. For this reason, natural gas is set to remain a pivotal component of the energy landscape, given its status as the fossil fuel with the lowest greenhouse gas emissions, provided these emissions are effectively managed.

However, even under the most optimistic circumstances, the rate of decline in the production of the world’s current stock of natural gas wells is faster than the projected decline in demand. Given that oil and gas currently account for 55% of the world’s energy supply and success depends on preserving access to reasonably priced energy both now and during the energy transition, sustained investment is fundamentally necessary.

In the aftermath of the transition phase, hydrogen is expected to be the most promising alternative to traditional fossil fuels, offering a clean and sustainable source of energy. However, one of the major challenges in promoting widespread adoption of hydrogen is its efficient transportation and storage. Fortunately, existing natural gas infrastructure allows for the integration of hydrogen into the existing energy system, leveraging the extensive network of pipelines. While certain modifications and safety measures are necessary, repurposing natural gas infrastructure offers a cost-effective and environmentally friendly approach to hydrogen transport.

Investment and trade in hydrogen will have a significant impact on bilateral relations, leading to the establishment of new interdependency patterns. The production of green hydrogen may have significant geopolitical and economic implications for nations with a surplus of inexpensive renewable energy. In a world of expanding export markets and diversifying economies, hydrogen can present a viable alternative for exporters of fossil fuels.

Another critical aspect of the transition to renewable energy sources is the supply chain, which faces significant challenges particularly regarding rare earth elements and critical minerals that are necessary for batteries and other green technologies.

Resource security and geopolitical dynamics are among the challenges that have been shown to arise, because of these materials’ relative scarcity, geographic concentration of production and processing in a few countries and growing demand. For both producing and consuming countries, the vulnerabilities and uncertainties created by this concentration may affect the adoption, cost, and sustainability of energy transition technologies, while concerns have been expressed about possible manufacturing and supply bottlenecks and interruptions that will lead to serious geopolitical repercussions.

Meanwhile, most of the maritime trade related to energy is expected to involve hydrogen, synthetic fuels, biomass, and renewable energy technologies such as batteries and photovoltaics. This shows that energy dependence can be reduced but not completely eliminated, as it will change form. However, this reform in conjunction with other geopolitical factors and disruptions to international shipping could reshape global maritime networks and alter the landscape of world trade.

Finally, in this context, the energy transformation driven by renewables could lead to partially decentralized energy systems and a dispersion of power, empowering new actors. This shift from global markets to regional networks will occur as countries that currently import oil from the other side of the world will seek to develop renewable sources and connect their networks to those of neighboring markets. Distributed renewable electricity generation can provide a first step on the development ladder and improve the quality of life of the world’s poorest at a reasonable cost, especially if combined with batteries or backup fossil-fuel capacity to manage intermittency. Especially, the countries in the Global South intend to utilize their natural resources to promote economic growth and reduce their reliance on traditional energy imports, thus expanding the renewable energy market in the region. These shifts could transform the global energy landscape and alter the traditional power dynamics that have favored countries which traditionally relied on exporting gas and oil and now are facing significant challenges in the current geopolitical environment.

Author Bio

*Dimitrios-Periklis Giannoulis graduated from the Hellenic Air Force Academy and holds a PhD in Multiphase Flows from the University of Patras. He works as an aircraft maintenance manager. His role involves organizing and supervising the service, repair and periodic maintenance of aircraft and jet engines and developing process improvements for maintenance activities. His research activities include CFD engineering applications, underwater oil and natural gas leaks, alternative aviation and marine fuels.

Bibliography

Pepe, Jacopo Maria, Dalia Ansari, and Robert M. Gehrung. The Geopolitics of Hydrogen Technologies, Actors, and Scenarios until 2040. SWP Research Paper no. 13. Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), November 16, 2023.
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2023RP13_GeopoliticsHydrogen.pdf.

Srinivasan, Sree, Christopher Robinson, Simon Blakey, Claire Mauduit-LeClercq, Julien Bernu, CFA, and Anastasia Pantazopoulou. Hydrogen: New Ambitions and Challenges—Is Low-Carbon Hydrogen Ready for Lift-Off? S&P Global, February 15, 2024.
https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/special-reports/look-forward/hydrogen-new-ambitions-and-challenges.

Finley, Mark, and Samantha Gross. “Navigating Market and Political Uncertainties in the Age of Energy Transition.” Brookings Institution, March 11, 2025.
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/navigating-market-and-political-uncertainties-in-the-age-of-energy-transition/.

International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation. Abu Dhabi: IRENA, 2019.
https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2019/Jan/Global_commission_geopolitics_new_world_2019.pdf.

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Technology Brief: Hydrogen. Geneva: UNECE, August 31, 2022.
https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/Hydrogen%20brief_EN_final.pdf.

The recently published U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS 2025) is the most significant shift of the American Grand Strategy since the end of the Cold War. The Strategy’s cornerstone is the America First doctrine as it rejects decades of liberal internationalist assumptions replacing them with a sovereignty first approach to the international system. The main priority for Washington is the protection of the homeland by restoring the American industrial and military power. At the same time, Washington is not interested in the promotion of universal norms and seeks the reduction of the costly foreign entanglements.

The 2025 NSS highlights the restraint and the selective interference abroad but also underlines the willingness to employ decisive force every time the core U.S. interests are at stake. The latter is evident especially in the Western Hemisphere, where the U.S. openly revived a modern and more strict version of the Monroe Doctrine logic. The recent U.S. military operation in Caracas, the capital city of Venezuela, and the capture of President N. Maduro illustrates how this approach blends non interventionist rhetoric with assertive regional enforcement.

This paper suggests that the 2025 NSS reflects a fundamental strategic shift as the U.S. is preparing to operate withing a global disorder defending its own interests which include border control, economic independence and internal cohesion. This strategic shift has its own risks which include alliance strain, legal contestation, regional fragmentation, and erosion of international norms.

Strategic Context

The recent publication of the 2025 NSS under President D. Trump marks a shift in how Washington perceives its own role in the international system. The NSS 2025 does not seek to defend or reform the liberal order as it does not serve anymore the American interests.

More specifically, the NSS 2025 criticizes the post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. It’s main argument is that the United States have overextend itself by attempting to manage global issues which were not entirely related to its own national security. Humanitarian interventions, the democratic promotion, climate diplomacy and multilateral governance are portrayed as distractions that actually weakened American power and sovereignty.

That said, the NSS 2025 gives a narrower definition of national interest. National security is not defined by forward presence or alliance leadership but by controlled over supply chains, energy resources, technological innovation and of course borders. In this context, power should be used only selectively in forms of decisive deterrence, coercive diplomacy and fast dealmaking.

The NSS suggests that the international system has already entered a multipolar phase which is characterized by instability, contested norms, and declining institutional authority. In this context, the NSS argues, survival and resilience matter more than legitimacy or consensus.

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Issue Overview

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), released in November 2025 marks a sharp recalibration of America’s priorities in a increasingly unstable international system. Washington faces Great Power competition with the revisionist powers, mainly China and Russia, global economic volatility and deep domestic political polarization. In this context, the differences between President Trump’s 2025 strategy, former President Biden’s approach and again President Trump’s 2017 doctrine reveal different paths for American foreign policy.

This comparative chart breaks down how each NSS defines the core pillars of U.S. statecraft (threat perceptions, alliances, migration, climate, energy, and the future of the international order), offering a clear side-by-side look at the competing worldviews shaping U.S. foreign policy today.

Comparative Analysis of Core Strategic Pillars

1. Overall framing

• Trump 2025 NSS

America First 2.0; core interests: sovereignty, border security, economic & cultural survival.

• Biden 2022 NSS

Revitalizing rules-based order: democracy vs autocracy.

• Trump 2017 NSS

America First branding but in the context of global leadership.

2. Top threats

• Trump 2025 NSS

China (economic/tech), illegal migration, internal decay, western hemisphere instability.

• Biden 2022 NSS

China systemic rival, Russia acute threat, global challenges: climate change and pandemics.

• Trump 2017 NSS

China & Russia as revisionist powers, terrorism.

3. International order

• Trump 2025 NSS

Rejects globalism, primacy of nation-states, anti-transnationalism.

• Biden 2022 NSS

Defend & modernize liberal order, promote democracy.

• Trump 2017 NSS

Supports rules-based order, traditional U.S. leadership.

4. Alliances

• Trump 2025 NSS

Transactional: pushing NATO allies to 5% GDP, burden-shifting, skeptical of EU.

• Biden 2022 NSS

Alliances core asset, strong NATO/EU/Indo-Pacific ties.

• Trump 2017 NSS

Supports alliances but expects fairness, less confrontational than 2025.

5. Climate & energy

• Trump 2025 NSS

Rejects Net Zero, energy independence and dominance (fossil + nuclear).

• Biden 2022 NSS

Climate central to security, green tech & energy transition.

• Trump 2017 NSS

Energy dominance but without sharp anti-climate framing.

6. Economic policy

• Trump 2025 NSS

Tariffs, reshoring, industrial base rebuild, supply chain control.

• Biden 2022 NSS

Industrial policy and open trade with allies, secure supply chains.

• Trump 2017 NSS

Fair trade, open markets, anti-unfair practices.

7. Migration

• Trump 2025 NSS

Mass migration consists a national security threat.

• Biden 2022 NSS

Humane migration management. Migration is not existential threat.

• Trump 2017 NSS

Border control as security but no civilizational framing.

8. Use of force

• Trump 2025 NSS

Predisposition to non-intervention, deterrence and dealmaking.

• Biden 2022 NSS

Selective use, forward presence, Ukraine & Indo-Pacific support.

• Trump 2017 NSS

Peace through strength, counterterrorism heavy.

9. Western Hemisphere

   Trump 2017 NSS

   Defensive posture, fragmented regional approach

   Biden 2022 NSS

   Normative and developmental focus, low strategic coercion

   Trump 2025 NSS

   Reclaiming U.S. dominance over the Americas, economic and military enforcement, explicit rollback of foreign influence

10. Europe & Russia

• Trump 2025 NSS

Europe in civilizational decline. Push for Ukraine settlement with Russia. NATO expansion skepticism.

• Biden 2022 NSS

Strong support for Ukraine, Russia acute threat.

• Trump 2017 NSS

Russia & China threats, NATO strengthening.

11. Indo-Pacific & China

• Trump 2025 NSS

China as economic competitor, burden-sharing, focus on supply chains.

• Biden 2022 NSS

China as top systemic rival, ideological competition.

• Trump 2017 NSS

China strategic competitor, mix with terrorism focus.

12. Middle East

• Trump 2025 NSS

Deprioritized, investment, Abraham Accords, weakened Iran.

• Biden 2022 NSS

Regional stability, Iran challenge, alliances strong.

• Trump 2017 NSS

Counterterrorism focus, Iran/NK threats.

Development of U.S. Strategic Change

The evolution of the U.S. National Security Strategy from 2017 to 2025 shows a steady shift in the ways Washington understands its own role in the world. While all three strategies recognize the return of Great Power competition, they differ fundamentally in how the U.S. should respond to it.

To begin with, the 2017 National Security Strategy, under the first presidency of D. Trump, introduced the America First concept which was operated within the existing international order. China and Russia were identified as revisionist powers, alliances were maintained, and U.S. leadership remained central, even if framed more transactionally. America sought to renegotiate the terms of its global leadership not abandon it.

The 2022 NSS, issued by President J. Biden, aimed to restore Washington as the main defender of the liberal international order. In this context, global politics were perceived as a competition between democracies and autocracies. Alliances were elevated to core strategic assets for Washington, while the security priorities included global health and the climate change. The assumption was that U.S. leadership, combined with strong alliances and partnerships, could still stabilize the international system.

The most recent NSS, published in 2025 by D. Trump, constitutes a significant shift from both the previous National Security Strategies. America is not seeking anymore to reform the international system but instead to defend and promote its own national interests, its sovereignty, secure its own borders, economic nationalism and internal cohesion. Even its core alliances are treat instrumentally while mass immigration is considered a national security threat. At the same time, global governance is rejected in favor of “America First”, nation state primacy. Washingtons focus has shifted from leading the international system to preparing for global disorder.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the recent NSS marks the decisive shift from both the previous U.S. national strategies. Even though the three strategies, 2017, 2022 and 2025, acknowledge the return to the spotlight of global politics the Great Power competition, and especially the strategic competition with China, the 2025 NSS fundamentally reframes the American role in world affairs.

Thus, the United States are not anymore the guardian of the liberal world order. Instead, Washington is driven by its core national interests which include border security, economic nationalism, industrial capacity, and cultural resilience. In this new context, democratic values and the alliance leadership are not Washington’s main strategic principles as it presented as a self-contained power which is defending its interests in an increasingly fragmented and multipolar international system.

This strategic shift reflects the realities of the current era, where internal cohesion, migration pressures, and economic resilience matter as much as traditional geopolitics. That said, the 2025 NSS marks that the U.S. is not solely focused on shaping the international system but rather is preparing itself for a long period of global disorder.

References

https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf

https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

What Are the SDGs?

The SDGs are the world’s shared blueprint for a better, fairer, and more sustainable future.

Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) is a set of 17 global objectives established by the United Nations in 2015 as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. They are a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure peace and prosperity for all people by the year 2030. The SDGs cover a wide range of interconnected social, economic, and environmental priorities, from eradicating hunger and ensuring quality education, to tackling climate change and building strong institutions. Unlike previous development frameworks, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the SDGs apply to all countries, rich and poor, and emphasize inclusive, equitable, and sustainable growth. There are 169 specific targets under the 17 goals, supported by over 230 measurable indicators, which serve as tools for monitoring progress and guiding policy:

1. No Poverty

2. Zero Hunger

3. Good Health and Well-being

4. Quality Education

5. Gender Equality

6. Clean Water and Sanitation

7. Affordable and Clean Energy

8. Decent Work and Economic Growth

9. Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure

10. Reduced Inequalities

11. Sustainable Cities and Communities

12. Responsible Consumption and Production

13. Climate Action

14. Life Below Water

15. Life on Land

16. Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

17. Partnerships for the Goals

The SDGs were never intended to be optional aspirations. Rather, they represent a globally endorsed framework for sustainable progress, an agreement between governments, international institutions, and civil society that a better future is both necessary and possible.

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Introduction

We are living in the era of renewed power politics, where the U.S. and China compete for global dominance. At the same time other powers have risen contributing to the emergence of a multipolar world order. Within this shifting strategic environment, militarization is back at the center of international affairs. In 2024, global military expenditure reached an unprecedented $2.7 trillion after a decade of steady growth. Yet, as history does not repeat itself, this is not a simple revival of the Cold War arms race. On the contrary, states today maintain significantly smaller armed forces while are channeling resources into high-tech weapons with high precision, advanced networked capabilities, and nuclear expansion/modernization. The result is a new kind of global arms race focusing on quality rather than quantity.

This paper uses two cornerstone references namely the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) and the SIPRI Yearbook 2025, to map who is spending, why they are spending, and who is selling, with comparisons to the late Cold War and the immediate post–Cold War era.

I. From Cold War Mass to 21st-Century Precision

During the Cold War’s peak, world military burdens hovered well above five percent of global GDP. Today the global military burden is roughly one-half of that level, even as absolute spending is at a record high. IEP shows the armed forces rate fell from about 700 per 100,000 people in the early 1970s to around 350 per 100,000 by 2020, a structural shift away from mass armies and toward technologically dense forces, which can easily be more lethal. At the same time, SIPRI records ten consecutive years of spending growth culminating in 2024’s historic high. These two trends, shrinking personnel and rising budgets, define the modern militarization paradox.

Figure 1. Global military expenditure in constant USD (approximate trend).

Figure 2. Armed forces rate per 100,000 population has halved since the 1970s.

II. Where the Money Goes. Regional Patterns and Big Players

Military spending is concentrated in North America, Europe, and Asia–Oceania, but every region is rearming even in slower pace. Europe has seen the steepest post-2015 increase; Asia–Oceania accounts for persistent, multi-decade growth; and the Middle East remains a high-intensity procurement market fluctuating with conflict cycles.

Figure 3. Regional distribution of military spending, 2024.

Figure 4. Change in military spending by region, 2015–2024.

North America is anchored obviously by the United States, which spent roughly $1 trillion in 2024 which is more than the next three countries combined. In NATO Europe, 17 of 30 members reached or exceeded the alliance’s 2% of GDP benchmark in 2024. The most dramatic annual increases included Romania (+43%), the Netherlands (+35%), Sweden (+34%), Poland (+31%), and Germany (+28%). These figures reflect a strategic pivot to deterrence-by-denial along NATO’s eastern flank, accelerated by the Ukraine war and a renewed emphasis on stockpiles, air defense, and long-range strike.

Asia–Oceania has experienced uninterrupted growth for 35 years. China accounts for about half of the region’s total, an estimated $314 billion in 2024 (+7% year-on-year). Beijing’s multi-domain modernization includes anti-access/area denial, ballistic and cruise missiles, a rapidly modernizing navy, and a growing nuclear force. Japan posted a 21% increase in 2024 which is its largest since 1952, accelerating missile defense, standoff munitions, and hardening of bases in the southwest islands. India continues steady growth focused on contested borders with China and Pakistan and on maritime presence in the Indian Ocean. Australia’s procurement of long-range strike and undersea capabilities complements these trends.

In the Middle East military expenditure increased significantly in 2024, because of the Gaza War and other regional clashes. In this regard, Israel increased its defense budget by 65% while Saudi Arabia remained among the world’s top spenders. Other regional actors like Türkiye posted a 12% increase which highlights the growth of its domestic defense industry. Across the region, procurement priorities converged on air and missile defense, precision-strike systems, and loitering munitions, capabilities reflecting both immediate conflict pressures and longer-term strategic competition.

Africa’s military spending remains comparatively small (~$52 billion in 2024), however, modern warfare, including UAVs and missiles, is reshaping conflict dynamics in regions like the Sahel, Sudan and Somalia. Finally, Central and South America have showed mixed trends as South America’s spending is roughly flat, while Central America and the Caribbean saw a notable increase driven by internal security challenges and fleet and air-asset recapitalization.

III. The Arms Industry. Concentrated Supply, Expanding Demand

The SIPRI Top 100 recorded $632 billion in arms revenues in 2023, with 73 firms increasing sales and 39 posting double-digit growth. The top five firms, Lockheed Martin, RTX, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General Dynamics are all American and together represent roughly one-third of the Top 100 total. Chinese manufacturers remain ascendant, with nine companies in the ranking and three in the top ten. On the other hand, Russia’s data are unclear. The available data show two major firms with a combined $25.5 billion in 2023 revenues (+40% year-on-year), underscoring war-driven demand despite sanctions and capacity constraints. Western defense companies are doubling down on mergers and acquisitions, especially in areas like AI-driven command systems, electronic warfare, missile defense, and drones.

Figure 5. Top arms exporters, 2020–24.

Figure 6. Top arms importers, 2020–24.

Arms transfers have been stable in aggregate over the last fifteen years, but regional flows have shifted markedly. Transfers to Europe jumped 155% in 2020–24 relative to 2015–19, driven by Ukraine and NATO rearmament. The top recipients were Ukraine, India, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. On the supply side, the United States expanded its global share to 43% (+21% from the prior period). France became the second-largest exporter (9.6%). Russia’s exports halved compared to 2015–19, falling to their lowest level in any five-year window since 1950 for Moscow or the Soviet Union. China and Germany rounded out the top five.

IV. Missiles, UAVs, and the Return of Long-Range Strike

Modern conflict is defined by volume fire, long-range strike, and air & missile defense saturation. In 2024 Russia used thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles and one-way attack UAVs against Ukraine, while Ukraine expanded deeper strikes into Russian territory with Western-plausible systems. Europe faces what SIPRI calls a missile renaissance: the U.S. will station ground-launched missiles in Germany from 2026, and European states launched a cooperative Long-range Strike Approach to co-produce medium-range systems. In the Middle East, Iran’s direct missile salvos against Israel, Hezbollah’s persistent rocket and UAV campaigns, and the Houthis’ strikes on shipping underscore a multifront contest of long-range fires. Across sub-Saharan Africa, at least six conflicts saw use of armed UAVs since 2021, with nearly a thousand civilians killed by strikes, an indicator of rapid proliferation and doctrinal diffusion.

V. Nuclear Forces: A New Qualitative Arms Race

As of 2025, nine countries possess about 12,241 nuclear warheads, with roughly 3,912 deployed and around 2,100 kept at high operational alert. The United States and Russia still hold almost 90% of the total while they are modernizing their nuclear triad: the delivery systems, warheads, and production infrastructure. China’s stockpile rose from ~500 to as many as 600 warheads in one year, coupled with silo field construction and MIRV-capable missile development, aiming to possess more than 1,000 at the end of the decade. India and Pakistan continue to expand and diversify triad elements. North Korea advances toward multiple-warhead capabilities and sea-based options. In Europe, doctrinal debate has intensified as extended deterrence is revalidated; the U.S. has upgraded NATO-stationed gravity bombs. Meanwhile, Russia’s 2024 update to its nuclear doctrine appears to broaden conditions for use.

Figure 7. Estimated nuclear warheads, January 2025.

VI. The Economic Burden and PPP Reality

IEP’s lens clarifies the domestic burden of defense outlays. As a share of total government spending, military budgets fell from over 10% in 2000 to under 7.5% by 2022, while health rose from about 5.1% to 7.3%, a partial rebalancing of state priorities. Yet in purchasing-power terms, the burden in emerging economies is far heavier than headline dollar figures imply.

India’s military spending in 2022, measured in PPP, reached roughly $247 billion, more than three times the constant-USD figure, indicating the real resource trade-offs borne domestically. Moreover, Russia’s PPP-to-USD ratio likewise exceeds two and a half, while China’s is 1.53. These differences shape industrial capacity, manpower costs, and the pace of procurement.

Figure 8. Government spending mix, 2000–2022 (illustrative).

VII. Why States Spend: Threats, Prestige, Industry, Alliances

States spent on defense for two main reasons. First, as they feel insecure, they know that self-help and hard power will provide them security and expand their influence in the global arena. Specifically, for the U.S., the challenge is about keeping the world’s dominance and containing the Chinese rise. On its behalf, China’s rise has made Asia a constant pressure point, while the U.S. still is involved in Europe and Middle East. This whole situation results in a defense budget that needs to cover multiple theaters at the same time. China is not facing this overextension its leaders perceive the Western Pacific as the frontline, where deterring U.S. intervention and safeguarding sea lanes is not optional but essential to both security and prosperity. The other Asian giant, India, is facing a complicated strategic environment as New Delhi is trying to balance between the West and especially the U.S., after the tariffs, its standing rivalry with Pakistan, and the careful approach with China. The complex strategic situation in the Indo-Pacific region has driven India to invest heavily on is military capabilities. In Europe, defense spending has drastically increased as the majority of the European NATO members are meeting finally the 2% GDP benchmark of defense spending set by the U.S. This increase indicates the common goal of detaining Moscow. In the Middle East, security threats are even more direct. Competition via proxy wars and direct military confrontation has fueled a constant demand for arms. In this regard, Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and the other Gulf States are continuing to invest heavily in missile defenses and develop their long strike capabilities. Also, for states like Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, defense industry is a way of national pride.

The common characteristic of the aforementioned regions is the existence of new military technologies. Precision strike weapons, advanced air defenses, and integrated command systems have set a new global baseline for credible deterrence. Even mid-sized powers can no longer rely on sheer manpower or legacy equipment—they are compelled to buy into this higher tier of capability. In today’s world, defense spending is not just about survival; it is about relevance.

Conclusion

The strategic map of militarization is being redrawn. Power is diffusing away from a small group of great powers even as the defense industrial base remains concentrated. Absolute spending is rising, personnel are shrinking, and lethal precision is proliferating. Europe is building magazines and air defenses at a pace unseen since the 1980s. Asia–Oceania is entrenched in a sustained maritime and aerospace competition. The Middle East is a laboratory for missiles and UAVs, with spillovers across the Red Sea and beyond. Nuclear arsenals are modernizing, and the guardrails of arms control have frayed. The new arms race is not merely about counting missiles or tanks; it is about the speed of adaptation—industrial, doctrinal, and technological. That is the decisive metric of power in the 2020s.

References

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Summary. Solna, 2025. Key sections cited: Military Expenditure; Arms Production; International Arms Transfers; World Nuclear Forces; Missiles and UAVs.

Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP). Contemporary Trends in Militarisation 2024. Sydney: IEP, 2024. Key sections cited: personnel trends, PPP comparisons, government spending composition.

Appendix: Regional Deep Dives & Historical Comparisons

Europe vs. the Late Cold War: SIPRI notes that the 2020–24 volume of international arms transfers to Europe rose by 155 percent relative to 2015–19 and reached levels far higher than in any of the previous six five-year periods. However, compared to the Cold War peak (1980–84), today’s global volume is still about 35 percent lower. The difference lies in the qualitative shift: more precision munitions, integrated air and missile defense, and industrial base expansion to sustain high-tempo operations, rather than mass platforms alone.

Ukraine and the Ecosystem of Suppliers: At least thirty-five states delivered major arms to Ukraine between 2020 and 2024, mostly as aid packages. This created a trans-Atlantic supply chain spanning artillery, air defense, armor, and ISR, and accelerated NATO standardization of munitions and C4ISR. The political effect is durable: NATO members not only increased spending but reoriented defense plans around stockpile depth, surge capacity, and resilience.

Asia & Oceania Trajectories: China’s estimated $314 billion defense budget in 2024 accounted for about half of all regional expenditure. Japan’s 21 percent jump, the largest since 1952, hastened procurement of standoff missiles and layered air defenses. India, with rising PPP-adjusted defense outlays, is expanding naval aviation and surface combatants while investing in missile defense and dual-capable systems. Australia remains a top global importer (3.5 percent of 2020–24 imports), channeling funds to undersea warfare and long-range fires.

Middle East Dynamics: Israel’s 65 percent rise in spending reflects multi-front operations, air & missile defense saturation, and extended strike campaigns. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, both top global importers in 2020–24, continue deep procurement across air power, air defense, and precision strike. Türkiye’s 12 percent increase complements indigenous production and export ambitions, including UAVs and guided munitions.

Sub-Saharan Africa & UAV Diffusion: Confirmed use of armed UAVs in at least six conflicts, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan, contributed to more than 940 civilian deaths between November 2021 and November 2024. Non-state actors show increasing UAV activity across West Africa’s border zones and the Lake Chad Basin. Regulatory frameworks lag technology, with no dedicated multilateral process to govern armed UAVs.

Missile Renaissance in Europe: After the demise of the INF Treaty, Europe moved to rebuild long-range strike. In July 2024, Germany and the United States agreed to station U.S. ground-launched missiles in Germany from 2026, while France, Germany, Italy, and Poland signed a letter of intent (later joined by Sweden and the U.K.) to co-produce medium-range missiles. The shift parallels renewed investment in integrated air and missile defense across NATO states.

Russia–Ukraine Missile Duel: Between January and September 2024, Ukraine reported nearly 5,500 Russian ballistic and cruise missile and one-way UAV launches—over twenty per day on average. In November 2024, Russia tested the dual-capable Oreshnik intermediate-range missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles against Dnipro. Later that month, the United States authorized Ukraine to use certain U.S.-supplied systems to strike deeper into Russian territory, putting key logistics and bases at risk.

Nuclear Guardrails Under Strain: At the start of 2025, nine nuclear-armed states held an estimated 12,241 warheads, about 3,912 of which were deployed, and roughly 2,100 at high alert. Russia updated its nuclear doctrine in November 2024, apparently widening scenarios for use. The U.S. confirmed it replaced NATO-stationed nuclear gravity bombs with upgraded versions. Russia and Belarus claimed Russian deployment on Belarusian territory, though conclusive evidence was lacking.